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PREFACE 
A s  an  undergrad~aate  s t u d e n t  a t  Drake T h i v e r s i t y ,  this 
wr i t e r  became i n t e r s s t e d  i n  two p a r t i c u l a r  areas of European 
h i s t o r y .  One was the s tudy  of s o u t h e a s t e r n  Europe-- t h e  -1- 
- 





i n  the last  c e n t ~ ~ ,  an  importance s o  f a r  o u t  of  p r o p o r t i o n  
to i t s  i feographical  e x t e n t  o r  s r z e  of popula t ion .  The second 
was the  s t u d y  of C m t m i s m ,  a p o l i t i c o - e c o n m i c  ideo logy  
which o r i g i n a t e d  and developed i n  Europe, and which today 
tf-zreatens t o  enqulf  the world. T h i s  work was a l o g i c a l  con- 
- 
-- sequence of  t h e s e  two i n t e r e s t s .  
- 
- 
- The d e f e c t i o n  o f  Yu ,~os l av i a  from t h e  fomurz i s t  b loc  
o f f e r e d  t h e  w r i t e r  a c h a l l e n r e .  Row had it  come abou t?  ',Tkat 
were i t s  causes?  Althoush s e v e r a l  books have a?peared s i n c e  
1950 which d e a l  w i t h  t h e  s u b j e c t  i n  a  s c h o l a r l y  an6 informa- 
t i v e  manner, a comparison and r e - eva lua t ion  were t h o u ~ h t  t o  
have m e r i t .  Yoreover, a s tudy  of t3is  s o r t  a a y  o f f e r  t o  the 
non- technica l  Anerican r eade r  a  u s e f u l  p r e s e n t a t i o n  sn6 9nalp-  
3 1 s  of a v i t s l  contemporary i s s u e ,  f o r  what 3appened i n  Y ~ p o -  
s l n v i a  was more than  j u s t  a n  i s o l a t e d  3a lksn  e ~ l s o d e ;  i t  was 
proof p o s i t i v e  t h a t  t h e  power ~ o l i t i c s  and i m p r i a l i s m  of 
t w e n t i e t h  cen tu ry  Somnunism i s  fundamental ly  no d i f f e r e n t  
from t h e  power p o l i t i c s  and i m p e r i a l i s n  of t h e  p a s t .  
Recnuae of t h e  write* l a c k  of f a c i l i t y  w i t h  S lavonic  
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*languages, sources  were of n e c e s s i t y  l i m i t e d .  This  handicap, 
however, w a s  not  as e r e a t  as might be imagined, f o r  many docu- 
ments of value a s  o r i g i n a l  source m a t e r i a l  have been t r a n s l a t e d  
i n t o  English.  Moreover, the re  i s  a weal th of secondary sources 
w r i t t e n  by competent scholars ,  both American and European. 
The w r i t e r  wishes t o  extend h i s  s i n c e r e  a p p r e c i a t i o n  
t o  D r .  Frank Rosenthal who guided t h i s  t h e s i s  from i t s  in-  
cep t ion .  His valuable suggest ions and p a t i e n t  c r i t i c i s m  made 
poss ib le  the  completion of t h i s  paper. Thanks a l s o  should 
go t o  D r .  Charles J. Ritchey of the  Department of His tory  and 
t o  Miss Myrtle Beinhauer of the  Graduate School of Drake Uni- 
v e r s i t y  f o r  t h e i r  kind encouragement and understanding he lp .  
The t r a n s l i t e r a t i o n  of Yugoslav names p resen t s  a 
d i f f i c u l t  problem. The w r i t e r  has followed as c l o s e l y  as 
poss ib le  t h e  Library  of Congress sys ten  of t r a n s l i t e r a t i o n  
f o r  Serbo-Croatian. This system, however, n e c e s s i t a t e s  a 
s p e c i a l  note  of caut ion,  f o r  c e r t a i n  consonantal  sounds a r e  
represented  by a f f i x i n g  accent  marks t o  o t h e r  consonants 
which bear  some resemblance t o  them. The fol lowing g ives  t h e  
approxinate  Enel ish pronunciation of accented consonants: 
6 a s  t h e  English t c h  i n  "witch." 
8 as  the  Ens l i sh  ch i n  "church." 
a s  the  English sh i n  "show." 
v 
z a s  t h e  English s i n  "pleasure." 
To make mat t e r s  even more confusing, "cn i s  pronounced 
a s  t h e  Enplish 'tsn i n  " l e t s n ,  and "jn as t h e  "yn i n  "ye tR.  
Unfortunately,  even t h i s  method i s  far  f r o 4  foolproof ,  
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and c e r t a i n  except ions have been made. I n  quo ta t ions ,  of 
course ,  t h e  s p e l l i n g  used i n  t h e  quoted source has  been 
followed. For  words i n  common use, p a r t i c u l a r l y  qeographic 
terms, t h e  Engl ish  s p e l l i n g  has  been employed, e.g.,  Belgrade 
f o r  Beograd and Yugoslavia f o r  Ju.goslavi ja. Also, the  au thor  
has  i n s e r t e d  an  e x t r a  Ifslf i n  t h e  word nKosovon, making i t  
" K O S S O V O ~ ,  t o  avoid the  English i n c l i n a t i o n  t o  use a n l o n g  
on i n  t h e  f i r s t  s y l l a b l e .  
The confusion r e s u l t i n g  from such a method i s  re -  
g r e t t a b l e .  However, i f  t h e  examples above a r e  followed, 
names can be pronounced i n t e l l i g i b l y .  Any at tempt  t o  d e a l  
w i t h  the  q u a l i t y  of vowels o r  s t r e s s  of s y l l a b l e s  would be 
f a r  beyond t h i s  w r i t e r ' s  province.  
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The Land and the People I 
I 
-.The Federa l  People 's  Republic of Yugoslavia i s  one 
of t h e  major p o l i t i c a l  d i v i s i o n s  of southeas tern  Europe- F 
Located i n  t h e  northwe s t e r n  por t ion  of t h e  Balkan Penin- 
I  
1 
s u l a ,  i t  i s  bounded by Aust r ia ,  Hungary, and Rumania on t h e  
n o r t h ;  by Rmania and Bulgaria on the  e a s t ;  by Greece and 1 
Albania on the  south ;  and by Albania, the Adr ia t i c  Sea, and 
I t a l y  on the  west. Nominally possessing a  republ ican  form 
I 
of government, t h e  country i s  composed of s i x  c o n s t i t u e n t  r e -  
pub l i c s  : Serbia ,  Croat ia ,  Slovenia,  Montenegro, Bosnia- , 
1 
Herzoeovina, and Macedonia. 
Yuroslavia has a  t o t a l  a r e a  of 98,896 square mi les ,  
encompassing a treat d i v e r s i t y  of n a t u r a l  environnent , The 
i 
I 
towering Alps of Central  Europe p r o j e c t  i n t o  t h e  northwest 1 I 
corne r  of t h e  country;  the  Dinaric Alps border  the c o a s t ;  a 1 
I 
rou,yh ba r ren  k a r s t  region l i e s  between the  Dinaric  Alps and I 
t h e  A d r i a t i c  coast; '  the  Balkan and Rhodope mountains of Bul- 
I 
I 
r a r i a  j u t  a c r o s s  the  e a s t e r n  border;  i n  t h e  n o r t h  a long the  I I 
Iv. C.  Finch and G. T. Trewartha, Elements of Ceocraphy: 1 
:.2 c Physica l  and Cul tu ra l  (New York: Kccraw-'rill ?oo:c .o., 1. -- 1 9 
p. 2al: " I n  rer-tons of pure limestone e s p e c i a l l y ,  underzround 
s o l u t i o n  may remove rock t o  the  e x t e n t  t h a t  l a r p  caverns a r e  
I 
formed o r  t h e  rock honeyconbed w i t h  smal l  c a v i t i e s ,  and the  
su r face  i s  d o t t e d  with depressions caused by s o l u t i o n  c a v i t i e s  , 
o r  by the  c o l l a ~ s e  of cavern roofs .  Such re , r ions a r e  s a i d  t o  
have k a r s t  f e a t u r e s ,  and i n  them a larfre  p a r t  of the  drsina_m 






v a l l e y s  of the  Sava, Drava, Danube, and Tisa  Rivers l i e s  t h e  
broad and f e r t i l e  Vojvodina Pla in ,  a southern appendage of 
the  Great Hungarian P l a i n ;  and along the  bas ins  of t h e  
and t h e  Vardar i n  t h e  south l i e s  another  rugged and chao,,, 
mountain region.  
Three d i s t i n c t  c l imates  a r e  found i n  Yugoslavia. 
Along t h e  A d r i a t i c  coas t  t h e  cl imate i s  mi ld  and sunny w i t h  
warm win te r s  and cool  summers. The p l a i n s  a r e a  and nor the rn  
i n t e r i o r  of the country l i e  wi th in  the  c e n t r a l  European 
c l i m a t i c  zone. It has h o t ,  moist  summers and cold,  snowy 
w i n t e r s .  I n  t h e  south,  a long the  Vardar and rlorava, a con- 
t i n e n t a l  c l ima te  p r e v a i l s  wi th  hot ,  dry  summers and cold  win te r s .  
Geographic b a r r i e r s  have had a profound e f f e c t  on the  
development of Yugoslavia. Since mountains and p l a t e a u s  occupy 
approximately 75 percent  of the  land,  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  has  never 
developed t o  an adequately e f f i c i e n t  s t age .  The r o  stem 
Is  poor, p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  the  e a s t e r  try, 
w i t h  very few hard surfaced,  a l l - w e a ~ n e r  roaas. 
The r a i l r o a d  system i s  l ikewise poorly developed. 
Althouch the country has over 7,000 mi les  of r a i l r o a d s ,  they 
)f the  
fo l low only  t h e  e s t a b l i s h e d  routes. '  Thus, t h e r e  a r e  rail- 
road l i n e s  between a l l  major c i t i e s ,  but  connections between 
t h e  c o a s t  and i n t e r i o r  a r e  poor a s  a r e  those i n  t h e  mo-m remote 
s e c t i o n s  of the  country.  Fecause of these  r a t h e r  poor f a c i l -  
i t i e s ,  the  Y u ~ o s l a v s  a r e  forced t o  r e l y  heav i ly  on t h e i r  1,300 
1 ~ u ~ h  Seton-Watson, " Y U ~ O S ~ ~ V I ~ ,  E r i t ann ica  Fook of 
t h e  Year : 1954, p. 758 : According t o  f i c u r e s  a v a i l a b l e  i n  
1!449, Yuroslnvla had 7,113 mi les  of r a i l r o a d s .  
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miles  of navigable  r i v e r s  and streams. 
The geop~raphic b a r r i e r s  t o  d e v e l o p e n t  a r e  f u r t h e r  
e v i d e n t  i n  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  the  c o a s t a l  mountains and t h e  rugged 
and i n h o s p i t a b l e  k a r s t  r ee lon  i n t e r p o s e s  a formidable b a r r i e r  
between t h e  nor thern  p l a i n s  where most of t h e  people l i v e ,  
and t h e  coas t ,  which would otherwise give easy  access  t o  t h e  
r e s t  of the  world. This region s o  hampers the  development 
of s e a p o r t s  and the  e f f e c t i v e  use of the  A d r i a t i c  t h a t ,  a l -  
though a c o a s t a l  country,  Yugoslavia i s  a Danubian s t a t e ,  
which i n  the  n o r t h  has  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  been fo rced  t o  keep i n  
c l o s e  touch wi th  Hungary. 
Moreover, the  very geographical p o s i t i o n  of t h e  
coun t ry  has  proved t o  be a t r a g i c  circumstance f o r  i t s  people, 
f o r  a c r o s s  the  country l i e  f o u r  of the  main invas ion  and m i -  
p r a t i o n  c o r r i d o r s  of southeas tern  Zurope. A t  Eelgrade t h r e e  
of these  rou tes  converge : t he  f i r s t ,  the  l and  and waterway 
a l o n c  t h e  Danube Valley from the  Vienna Gabe t o  the  Black Sea, 
connec t i n p  c e n t r a l  wi th  southeas tern  Europe and Europe w i t h  
t he  Steppes and Asia Kinor;  the second, t h e  c o r r i d o r  from t h e  
n o r t h  A d r i a t i c  (Pea r t r ee  Pass)  a long t'ne Sava X v e r  t o  Belgrade; 
and t h e  t h i r d ,  the  north-south route  from Belgrade through ~ i g  
'and Skopl je along the v a l l e y s  of the Vardar and 3!orava t o  
Salonika .  The f o u r t h  of these  g r e a t  c o r r i d o r s  i s  a c t u a l l y  a 
branch of t h e  north-south route.  It runs from ??i; i n  the  
Morava Valley throuph Sof ia  and Adrianople t o  I s t anbu l .  
 rein^ thus  s i t u a t e d ,  Yucoslavia has  experienced a his- 
t o r y  of f o r e i p n  invasions.  From e a r l y  Greece t o  t h e  twen t i e th  
century  t h e  p r e a t  powers of S a s t e r n  Europe have v i e d  f o r  h e r  
-6 - 
s t r a t e g i c  avenues, s e r i o u s l y  h inder ing  u n i t e d  p o l i t i c a l  I 
I development .' Moreover, each invas ion  and each migra t ion  of 
peoples  has  l e f t  i n  i t s  wake s t r a g c l i n g  remnants of i t s  horde, 
t h u s  e f f e c t i n g  a profound inf luence  upon t h e  c u l t u r e  and e th -  I 
nography of t h e  modern s t a t e .  1 
Despite a l l  these  geographical  disadvantages,  Yugo- 
s l a v i a  has  r a t h e r  promising p o t e n t i a l i t i e s .  Nearly one- 
t h i r d  of t h e  a r e a  of t h e  country i s  covered wi th  f o r e s t s ,  
making h e r  an important producer of timber and wood pulp. 
Futhermore, t h e  country i s  the  chief  source of minera ls  i n  
I 
sou theas te rn  Europe. The p r i n c i p a l  minera ls  include copper, 1 
I i r o n ,  c o a l  and l i g n i t e s ,  bauxi te ,  lead ,  z inc ,  gold, antimony, 
chrome ore,  and s a l t ,  Under the  present  government~s  planned 
economy, a l l  these  resources ,  as we l l  as the  hydro-e lec t r i c  
I 
I 
p o t e n t i a l  of the  coun tm,  a r e  beinn developed t o  the f u l l e s t  1 
poss ib le  e x t e n t .  
Y u ~ o s l a v i a ~ s  l a c k  of e t h n o ~ r a p h i c  u n i t y  i s  ev ident  I 
i n  the  o r l r i n a l  name of the  country, t h e  Kingdom of t h e  Serbs,  ! I 
Croats ,  and Slovenes. It i s  even more evident ,  however, when 
l ~ l u b i § a  Sto  
i t i e s  i n  ~ ; r o s l a v i a  
p r i  sc I' Z!lros lav.! ja, ' 
I 
1 jkovi 6 and :.!iloZ :.:artid, ?Tational ?.'inor- I 
(Pelprade:  P ~ b l i s h i n ~  and Z d l t l n ~  Znter- 1 
'1952),  p. 5: " ~ u ~ o s l a v  h i s t o v  has 
been f u l l  of continuous wars and s t r u r - l e s  f o r  s u r v i v a l ,  
freedom and independence. Yanp conquerors have been a s s a u l t -  
l n c  t h i s  p a r t  of %rope, whlch, thourh not  l a r z e  i n  s i z e ,  i s  
of prime econonic and s t r a t e r i c  importance. The ancLent 
Creaks, the Avnrs, Goths, v i s i f o t h s ,  S a m a t i a n s ,  Gepids, 
Cerul ians ,  Huns, ?;:zantines, " s ~ a r s ,  T a r t a r s ,  Turks, Srusads, 
Cemflns and I t a l i a n s  have a l l  soufrht concuest t \ rourh  w 9 r  
I n  ivui*oalav t e r r l  tory .  For c e n t u r i e s  waves of conquerors 
swept over t he  Y u ~ o s l a v  lands,  succeedinr  one another ,  pur- 
su t n r  t h n l r  pol lcy  of plunder and a n n i h l i a t i o n  of yeople i n  
v ~ r l o u s  ways. Under t h e i r  onslnuril ts  t h e  populat ions of 
e n t i r e  reptons had t o  ak-andon t h e i r  hearths ."  
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it i s  considered t h a t  these  t h r e e  peoples account f o r  only 
75 percent  of the count ry ' s  populat ion.  A t  t he  time of the  
1948 census,  the  t o t a l  populat ion of the  country w a s  
1 5 , 7 7 2 , 1 0 7 . ~  This amazing e t h n i c  medley included s ix  con- 
s t i t u e n t  p l u r a l i t y  groups: 
Serbs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6,547,190 
Croats .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3,784,969 
Slovenians.  . . . . . . . . . . . .  1,415,214 
Ptacedonians . . . . . . . . . . . .  809,613 
Montenegrins . . . . . . . . . . . .  425,679 
. . .  n a t i o n a l l y  undeclared los lems 8 0 8 , 9 0 4 ~  
I n  a d d i t i o n ,  the  1948 census recorded the  presence 
of f i f t e e n  n a t i o n a l  m i n o r i t i e s .  These minor i ty  peoples in -  
cluded: 
. . . . . . .  Shquiptars  ( ~ l b a n i a n s ) .  750,483 
Hunwarians. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  496,493 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Ralachs 102,957 
Turks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  98,001 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Slovaks 83,624 
l ~ e t o n - ~ / a t s o n ,  OJ. c i t . ,  p. 557: For t h e  s ix  Yugo- 
s l a v  people! s repub l i c s  the-48 census f i p r e s  were : Serbia ,  
6,527,969; Croat ia ,  3,756,807; Slovenia,  1,391,873; Zosnia- 
Herzerovina, 2,565,283; TTacedonia, 1,152,986; and :.lontenegro, 
377,189. These s i x  people ' s  republ ics  are p r imar i ly  h i s t o r -  
i c a l  and p o l i t i c a l  u n i t s ;  they serve only t o  a l i m i t e d  e x t e n t  
as e t h n i c  o r  n a t i o n a l  d iv i s ions .  
' ~ u ~ o s l a v  Federa l  S t a t i s t i c a l  O f f  i ce ,  P rov i s iona l  
Resu l t s  of the  Population Census, S t a t i s t i c a l  F u l l a t i n ,  ::a, 1 
(Julg,, 1950:, PP* 16 17 - , c l t e d  by Ljubiga ~ t o y ~ o v i 6  and : : i lo5 
I :ar t ic ,  Kational LlinoritLes In Y u ~ o s l a v i a  ( E e l ~ r a d e  : Publish- 
Inc ~ n c i  ' ~ : L l L t  tnr: Fn tc rp r i so  ~ u r o s l s ~ j a , "  19521, p. 31. 




I t a l i a n s .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  79,573 
Gips ies  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  72,671 
Bulgarians.  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  61,140 I : 
Czechs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39,014 
Russenes (Ruthenians and Ukrainians) .  37,168 
Russians. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20,065 
Germans . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  55,328 
i 
Rumanians . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  64,092 1 
Jews. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6,861 I 
Greeks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1,897' 1 
Religious d iv i s ions ,  though fewer numerically,  are ! 
I 
l e s s  d ivergent .  Of the  s i x t e e n  m i l l i o n  i n h a b i t a n t s  I 
of Yugoslavia, f o r t y - e i g h t  percent  a r e  Serbian Orthodox, 
t h i r t y - f i v e  percent  a r e  Roman Cathol ic ,  e leven percent  a r e  
Yohammedan, and the  remaininp; s i x  percent  a r e  Jewish o r  of I I 
var ious  P r o t e s t a n t  denominations .2 I I 
The populat ion dens i ty  of Yugoslavia i s  over 170 per- ) I 
sons p e r  squam mile.3 However, the  f a c t  t h a t  only about  30 ! 1 
percen t  of the land i s  a r a b l e ,  coupled w i t h  the  extreme prim- I 
I I 
l t i v e n e s a  of c u l t i v a t i o n ,  makes Yugoslavia overpopulated.* 
2 ~ e t t e r  from >:laden Soich, Deputy Di rec to r ,  Yugoslav 
I n f o r m ~ t l o n  Center (New York), February 9, 1953. 
3 ~ h i s  f i m r e  i s  based on t h e  pre l iminary  r e s u l t s  of 
t h e  1953 populat ion census of 16,250,000 c i t e d  by Seton-Eatson, 
OJ. c., p. 557. For conparison, France has 199 p e r  sq. mi le ,  
C x e c ~ ~ o n l o v ~ k i a  250, Denmark 262. 
4 ~ l e x  N. Drapnich, "Socia l  S t r u c t u r e ,  Y u ~ o s l a v i a ,  
ed. by Robert J. Kerner Ferkley : Univers i ty  of S s l i z o r n i a  
Press ,  1949) ,  p. 223: " h There are3  n e a r l y  twice a s  nany ger- 
sons t o  t h e  square kilometer of a r a b l e  land  i n  Y ~ ~ ~ o s l a v i ~  s  
i n  western EuropeRn coun t r i e s  11 . . . .  
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Moreover, Yugoslavia i s  s a i d  t o  rank f i r s t  among European 
n a t i o n s  i n  n e t  growth of population.1 
Yugoslavia Is now and always has been a p r e d m i n a n t l y  
r u r a l  s o c i e t y .  P r i o r  t o  World War I1 t h ree -quar t e r s  of i t s  
popula t ion  was d i r e c t l y  dependent on a g r i c u l t u r e  and f o r e s t -  
ry.2 The census of 1948 would i n d i c a t e  that a smal ler  number 
w a s  s o  dependent, probably about 65 percent  .3 Much of this 
decrease  w a s  no doubt due t o  the  immediate pos t  war i n d u s t r i a l  
expansion under t h e  var ious  Cammunis t economic p lans ,  and 
according  t o  the  Yugoslaa government, th is  t r end  i s  s t i l l  
cont inuing.  4 
The educa t iona l  l e v e l  of the  Yugoslav populat ion i s  
very  low. When t h e  country w a s  e s t a b l i s h e d  fo l lowing World 
War I, only about 55 percent  of the  na t ion  could read  and 
w r i t s . "  In 1918 the  government organized a f r e e  compulsory 
educa t iona l  system. Under the  d i r e c t  c o n t r o l  of the  c e n t r a l  
' ~ o g a l  I n s t i t u t e  of I n t e r n a t i o n a l  A f f a i r s ,  Inf  orma- 
t i o n  Departhent, S o u t h - a s t e r n  Europe: A p o l i t i c a l  and Zcon- 
omic Survez (London: Oxford Vnivers i ty  I r e s s ,  19391, p. 141. 
3Because of the manner I n  which the  census of 1948 i s  
broken down, it i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  a r r i v e  a t  an  accura te  f igure,  
For  example, those Ind iv idua l s  who der ive  t h e i r  income from 
a ~ r i c u l t u r e  outs ide  of farm cooperat ives  a r e  l i s t e d  under the  
heading "Pr iva te  Indiv iduals ,"  a long w i t h  c e r t a i n  persons en-' 
raped i n  t r ade .  Thus, it i s  impossible t o  t e l l  from a v a i l a b l e  
i ' i m r e s  e x a c t l y  how many people are a c t u a l l y  en,pged i n  a p t -  
c u l t u r e .  
4 ~ s t t e r  from M. Soich, OJ. g. 
%ever in  K. Turosienski,  "Education, " ~ u ~ o s l a v i a ,  p. 230: 
"In t h e  southern  d i s t r i c t s ,  where the  Turks ru led  l o n ~ e s t ,  d y  
27-37 percent  of those over t e n  yea r s  of age could read and 
w r i t e .  Rg way of camparison, i n  the Slovene d i s t r i c t s ,  where 
t h e  somewhat more enl ich tened Austr ian rule had permitted edu- 
c a t i o n  a t  a much e a r l i e r  da te ,  more than 94 percent  were l i t e r -  
I 
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government, t h e  schools  served a s  e x c e l l e n t  vo ices  of Yugo- 
s l a v  na t ional i sm,  but  d id  l i t t l e  t o  a l l e v i a t e  t h e  enormous 
problem of i l l i t e r a c y .  J u s t  p r i o r  t o  World 'War 11, 40 per-  
I 3 
1 
cen t  of the  Yugoslavs remained i l l i t e r a t e ;  a f t e r  twenty y e a r s  1 
of e f f o r t  the  propor t ion  of i l l i t e r a c y  had been reduced only  
5 percent .  1 I 
I 
Post  World War I1 Yugoslavia seems t o  have made a 
genuine a t tempt  t o  e l imina te  i l l i t e r a c y .  New schools  have 
2 I been e s t a b l i s h e d ,  many of them teaching  i n  minor i ty  languages.  I 
There have been severa l  d r ives  a t tempt ing  t o  decrease i l l i t e r -  I 
acy among a d u l t s .  With a  well-organized e d u c a t i o n a l  system, 
extending i n t o  every corner  of the country and reaching every 




P o l i t i c a l l y ,  Yunoslavia i s  a  new country,  a l thouch i t s  
- 
a t e .  R u t  i n  s p i t e  of the  h iqher  degree of --,eracg i n  t h e  ? 
nor th ,  only 54.9 percent  of the na t ion  a s  a  whole could read  
and wri te .  Amonp women this 3ropor t ion  was only 43 percent ,  
thourh men made a b e t t e r  showing (67.3 percent)." 
i 
i 
l ~ b i d . ,  p .  243. Turosienski f u r t h e r  s t a t e s  : nThoueh 
the  s i t u a t i o n  i s  admit ted ly  bad i n  Yucoslavia, i t  g u s t  be re- 
membered t h a t  much of t h i s  i l l i t e r a c y  was present  i n  t h e  a d u l t  
p o ~ u l a t i o n .  Af te r  the F i r s t  World Var, educat ion  reached a 
l a r ~ e r  propor t ion  of the younFer yenerat ion.  With t h e  rees- 
tab l l shment  of Yuposlavia ~ n d  the r e a p p l i c a t i o n  of curnpulsory 
educat ion  t h e r e  i s  pood reason t o  be l i eve  t h a t  the  time w i l l  
soon come when Yurtoslavia may boast  of a  well-educated popu- 
l a t i o n  w i t h  a  fruitful c u l t u r e  of i t s  om." 
2 ~ e e  ~ t o j k o v i 6  and i ~ a r t i c ' ,  OJ. G., chap. VLII. 
h i s t o r y  goes back t o  t h e  s i x t h  century of t h e  C h r i s t i a n  e r a  
when t h e  va r ious  t r i b e s  of South Slavs migrated from the  
p l a i n s  of southern Russia and s e t t h d  i n  t h e  v a l l e y s  of t h e  
c e n t r a l  Ea1kans.l 
When the  S lavs  en te red  the  Balkans, they  cane not  a s  
n a t i o n s  but  a s  loose ly  o r ~ a n i z e d  t r i b e s .  The Slovenes s e t t l e d  
i n  the  nor the rn  por t ion  of the west Balkan region,  the Croats  
i n  t h e  c e n t e r ,  and the Serbs i n  the  south.2 A s  t r i b a l  power 
was consol ida ted ,  na t ion  s t a t e s  emerged. By the  middle of 
t h e  f o u r t e e n t h  century the  Serbs,  under Tsar  Stephen Dugan, 
had developed a l a r g e  and powerful empire s t r e t c h i n g  w e l l  
beyond the  Serbian  e t h n i c  borders  .3 Then came the  tu rn ing  
%toyan Pribichevich,  World Without End: The S a ~ a  
of Southeas tern  Europe (New York: Zeynal i-litchcock, 1939 ), 
n3. 17 f f : About 2, r300 I3. C. a croup of people known broadly 
as I l l y r s  moved down f r m  t h e  nor th  and s e t t l e d  i n  the north-  
wss tern  s e c t i o n  of the  Balkan Peninsula,  inc luding  n e a r l p  a l l  
of the  t e r r i t o r y  of present  day Yugoslavia. Although primar- 
i l y  a n  a p r i c u l t u r a l  people, the  I l l y r s  were f i e r c e  warr iors ,  
we l l  known an?. respected  by the  Greeks t o  t h e  south.  
Af te r  t h e  .?oman conquest of the  Salkans, the  I l l y r s  
o f f e r e d  t h e i r  m i l i t a r y  s e r v i c e s  t o  Rome, and i n  the  t h i r d  cen- 
t u r y  A. D, t h e i r  power had reached such an e x t e n t  t h a t  t h e y  
had ~ a i n e d  comand of t h e  Roman Amy. Since t h e  Roman Legions 
were the  source of Imperial  power, t h i s  neant  cornnard of t h e  
!loman Empire, Severa l  Emperors of t h a t  period-- amon; them 
Cladius the  Goth, Aurel ian,  and Ziocls t ion--  were I l l y r s .  
M t h  t h e  d i sen tepra t ion  of t h e  empire and the  i n n s -  
ions  from t h e  e a s t  by the  V i s i ~ o t h s  and %ns, t h e  power and 
in f luence  of the  I l l y r s  were completely destroyed. 
ef(obsrt J. Kerner, "The Yuposlav : . lo~ernent ,~  Y u ~ o s l a v i a ,  
OJ. G., p.  33. 
!:rsce nnd Co., 1!133 ) , pp. 152 f f 
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p o i n t  i n  Balkan h i s t o r y ,  the  invas ion  by the  Ottoman Turks. 
The Turks acquired t h e i r  f i r s t  European possess ion  
i n  1354 and immediately began t o  expand t h e i r  empire. Tne 
Byzantine Empire and Bulgaria bowed before the  Ottoman might,  
and t h e  Turks swept westward i n t o  Serbia .  Af te r  a s e r i e s  
I of minor combats the  Serbs and Turks came f a c e  t o  f a c e  f o r  
f i n a l  b a t t l e .  " In  the  g r e a t  i n t e r i o r  p l a i n  of Kossovo, s e t  
l i k e  an amphitheater  among the  Xacedonian mountains, on 
June 28, 1389, the  h o s t s  of Cross and Crescent met t o  decide 
the  f a t e  of the peninsula."' The outcome was dec i s ive .  The 
Serbs were defea ted  and Balkania l a y  p r o s t r a t e  a t  the  f e e t  of 
the  conquerors. 
The B a t t l e  of Kossovo marked the  beginning of centur -  , 
i e s  of bondage f o r  t h e  Serbs.  I n  the  yea r s  tha t  followed the  
Serbs r evo l t ed  many times, but  eenera l ly  these  r e v o l t s  were 
d i s u n i t e d  and i n e f f e c t i v e .  The first concerted u p r i s i n g  
took place i n  1804 under t h e  l eader sh ip  of the  Serbian hero  
K a r a ~ e o r c e  (Karadjord je) .  I n  1815 another  u p r i s i r q  under 
~ : i l o s  ~ b r e n o v i c '  obtained l imi ted  concessions from the  Turks. i I 
I n  t h e  period 1830 t o  1834, and due t o  p e r s i s t e n t  Russian I t 
pressure ,  Turkey made various concessions,  by v i r t u e  of which i 
Serb ia  became a n  autonomous s t a t e  w i t h  the r e b e l  Kilos' a s  
heredi tar 'g  pr ince  .2 It was not ,  however, u n t i l  t he  Congress 
of Rer l in  i n  1978 t h a t  lonc  s t r u p - l i n g  Serbia r a ined  f u l l  
and complete independence. 3 
J u s t  west of Serbia  a r e  two h i s t o r i c  provinces known 
3 ~ b i d  -** pp. 404 ?. 
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a s  Bosnia and Herzoeovina. Both have p r e d m i n a n t l y  Serb 
popula t ion .  Exposed equa l ly  t o  m i l i t a r y  conquest by S e r b i a  
t o  the  e a s t  and Hungary-Croatia t o  the  nor th ,  they  s m e h m  j 
managed t o  l e a d  a more o r  l e s s  independent ex i s t ence  under 
r u l e r s  of t h e i r  own. I 
1 
Religious schism plays  an  important p a r t  i n  t h e  his- 
t o r y  of these  provinces.  For c e n t u r i e s  t h i s  region  had been 
l 
a bat t leground of r e l i g i o u s  persuasion between the  L a t i n  and I 
Greek churches .l I r o n i c a l l y ,  the  i n h a b i t a n t s  had, i n  l a r g e  
numbers, turned t h e i r  backs on both f a i t h s  and accepted 
~ o ~ o m i l i s r n . ~  
A f t e r  the  Turkish conquest of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
i n  t h e  f i f t e e n t h  century,  many Serbian nobles adopted the  
14oslem f a i t h  i n  order  t o  r e t a i n  t h e i r  land and f e u d a l  p r i v i -  I i 
l eges .  Thus, i n  t h e  years  that followed, a g r e a t  many n a t l v e  i 
Serbians  of Rosnie-Yerzogorina accepted t h e  r e l i g i o n  of t h e i r  I : 
2 ~ b i d . ,  pp. 164 f :  Bopmilism made i t s  f i r s t  appear- 
ance i n  t h e a l k a n s  d u r i n ~  the t e n t h  century  under the aus- i I 
p i c e s  of a F u l g ~ r  p r i e s t  named Eogornil, f r o n  whom t h e  r e l Z ~ i o n  
der ived  i t s  name. The f a i t h  spread from Bulgaria t o  Serbia ,  i 
where i t  was s u ~ p r e s s e d ,  and then i n t o  Bosnia, where it received 
broad popular support .  I n  the f i f t e e n t h  century,  a Fosnlan I 
YJnr openly avowed himself a Fogornil, thus  t a k i w  a s tand  w i t h  
t h e  m a j o r i t y  of h i s  people. 
Ro~omilism is ,  i n  point  of doc t r ine ,  more o r  l e s s  
i d e n t i c a l  w i t h  o the r  h e r e t i c a l  s e c t s ,  such a s  t h e  Cathari ,  
Pa tarenes ,  and A l b l ~ e n e s ,  which d i squ ie ted  the  La t in  \Vest f o r  
many c e n t u r i e s .  I n  sum, Fogmil ism i n  form i f  n o t  i n  name, 
t r a v e l e d  beyond F a l k ~ n l a  and became t h e  most genera l  of a l l  
medieval h e r e s i e s ,  protest in^, wherever 'found, a c a i n s t  the 
l l r i t u a l i a t i c  forms and a r i s  t o c r a t l c  o rean iza t ion  of the  
Chsis t i a n  church." 
3 ~ a t t h e w  Spinka, "Modern 3 c c l e s i a s t i c a l  Development ," 
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The Congress of Ber l in  granted the  Austro-Hungarian 
Empire the  r i g h t  of occupation and admin i s t r a t ion  of Bo'snia- 
Herzegovina, al though t e c h n i c a l l y  i t  was s t i l l  a Turkish 
t e r r i t o r y .  I n  1908 the  Dual Monarchy formal ly  annexed t h e  
two provinces,  and they  remained under Austro-I-Iungarian r u l e  
u n t i l  t h e  end of World War I. 
It  w a s  i n  Bosnia t h a t  t h e  i n c i d e n t  occurred t h a t  pre- 
c i p i t a t e d  World War I. On June 28, 1914, the  ann ive r sa ry  of 
the  B a t t l e  of Kossovo, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, t h e  h e i r  t o  
the  Aus t r i an  throne,  en tered  the  Bosnian c a p i t a l ,  Sarajevo,  
and was a s s a s s i n a t e d  by Gavri lo  Pr inc ip ,  a young Serbian 
revolu t ionary .  Thus, a t  a tremendous cos t  t o  themselves and 
t o  the  world, t h e  Bosnians gained t h e i r  freedom. 
One of the  most p r imi t ive  a r e a s  of Yugoslavia i s  t h e  
former independent Kingdom of h!ontenegro, o r  by i t s  l o c a l  
name Crna Cora, the  Black T.:ountain. Inhabi ted  bp Serbs,  
I,!ontenefro was p a r t  of the f l o u r i s h i n ?  t w e l f t h  century Ser- 
b ian  Empire. Af te r  1389 and the  d i sas t rous  d e f e a t  a t  Kossovo, 
l a r p e  numbers of Serbs f l e d  before the  advancing Turks and 
took refuve i n  i t s  rup;pd mountain regions.  Many times i n  the  
follow in^ c e n t u r i e s  Turkish armies t r i e d  t o  conquer t h i s  t i n y  
countrg.  Thouph t h e  Turks never succeeded, it i s  poss ib le  
that f o r  a time some s o r t  of subnission w a s  made and a s l i ~ h t  
Yuposlavia,  p. 260. 
S c h e v i l l ,  F . c i t  ., p .  164 s t a t e s :  "Then s h o r t l y  a f t e r  the  middle o [ t r f i f t e e n t h  centurf2,  the Turks con- 
quered Posnia,  the  Fosnian Ro~umils  i n  l a r z e  numbers and 
apparen t ly  wlthout the need of much persuasion went over t o  
P.ioh~mmedanism, the slmple p m c t i c e s  of which were more con- 
~ o n L ~ 1  t o  them thnn the  e l a b o m t e  r i t u a l  of the  Orthodox Church." 
t r i b u t e  pa id  t o  the sultan. '  I n  1799 a t r e a t y  w a s  concluded 
between Turkey and i n  which t h e  Turks recognized, 
wi thout  r e s e r v a t i o n ,  t h e  f u l l  independence of the  kingdom .2 
To t h e  nor th  of the  Serbs a r e  found t h e i r  South S l a v  
b r o t h e r s ,  the Slovenes and the  Croats. The Slovenes a r e  t h e  
3 smal le s t  and t h e  weakest member of the  South S lav  f a n i l y .  
the  Great  and h i s  successors  drove them back t o  the  s i t e  of 
t he i r  p r e s e n t  h m e  a t  the  nor theas t  corner  of t h e  Adr ia t i c .  4 
The Slovenes never  had an independent s t a t e  of t h e i r  own, 
having come under Habsburg r u l e  i n  the  E!iddle Ages. I n  1909 
they  were incorpora ted  i n t o  Napoleon's shor t - l ived  I l l y r i a n  
Provinces b u t  were re turned  t o  Aust r ia  by the  Congress of 
Vienna, 1814-1815, and ru led  by them u n t i l  1919. 
Along the broad v a l l e y  of the  Sava X v e r  l i e s  Croatia. 
The Croats  were the  f i r s t  of the South Slavs  t o  form a power- 
ful ~ o v e m e n t ,  having t h e i r  o m  king; i n  the  t e n t h  century.  
I n  1102 Croat ia  became assoc ia ted  with 3tm.gar-y as a "separa te  
and independent p o l i t i c a l  e n t i t y .  "5 Afte r  the Hungarian de- 
f e a t  a t  the  F a t t l e  of !.!ohacs i n  1526, most of Croat ia  f e l l  t o  
the  Turks, and t h a t  which was l e f t  came under Habsburg cont ro l .  
l ~ e e  S c h e v i l l ,  9. c i t  
- 9 pp. 311 f f .  
4~uj?h  Seton-\!:at son, The East  European Revolution (New 
York: Freder ick  A .  P m e ~ e r ,  1!'51), p. 3.  
c i t  
' ) 
-16- 
By 1687 Croa t i a  w a s  once more under Hungarian r u l e ,  which 
con t inued  u n t i l  1918. 
The Croa ts ,  l i k e  t h e  Slovenes ,  do no t  r e g a r d  themselves  
as a Balkan people,  bu t  as C e n t r a l  Europeans, as perhaps  t h e y  
a r e .  Both of t h e s e  peoples  accep ted  C h r i s t i a n i t y  from Rome, 
and u n t i l  1918 were l i n k e d  p o l i t i c a l l y  and c u l t u r a l l y  w i t h  
c e n t r a l  Europe. This r e l i g i o u s  and c u l t u r a l  c leavaee  w a s  t o  
pose s e r i o u s  problems i n  f l e d g l i n g  Yucoslavia.  
North of Albania,  ex tending  over  two hundred m i l e s  
a l o n g  t h e  e a s t e r n  shores  of t h e  A d r i a t i c  Sea,  i s  a long  narrow 
s t r i p  of l a n d  known a s  Dalmatia. P a r t  of t h e  t e n t h  c e n t u r y  
Croat  s t a t e  and i n h a b i t e d  p r i m a r i l y  by Croats ,  D a l m a t i a  se rved  
b o t h  Turk i sh  and Venetian m a s t e r s .  I n  1797 Napoleon e v e  
Dalmatia t o  Aus t r i a ,  on ly  t o  s e i z e  i t  f o r  himself  e i g h t  y e a r s  
l a t e r  and t r a n s f e r  i t  t o  h i s  new Klngdon of I t a l y .  Prom 1909 
t o  1514 i t  f o m e d  p a r t  of  t h e  i l l - f a t e d  I l l g r i a n  Provinces ,  
an6 from t h e  S o n ~ r e s s  of Vienna u n t i l  t h e  end of Yorld  T a r  I, 
i t  was r u l e d  by Aus t r i a .  
The i d e a l ,  o r  i dea ,  of Yuroslav u n i t y  developed as 
p a r t  of t h e  f r u s t r a t e d  na t iona l i sm d i r e c t e d  a t  t h e  r u l i w  
I t a l i a n ,  Cem.an, ' laryar,  and. Turk. N a ~ o l e o n ' s  c r e a t i o n  of 
t h e  I l l y r i a n  Provinces  i n  1909 broucht  t h e  Croa ts  and Slovenes  
under u n i t e d  p o l i t i c a l  r u l e  f o r  t he  f i rs t  t ime.  Althouch t h e  
I l l y r i a n  Provinces  were s h o r t - l i v e d ,  " I l l y r i a n i s m n  h e c m e  a 
Croat  i d e a l .  1 
I n  t h e  f i r s t  h a l f  of the  n i n e t e e n t h  c e n t u r y  S e r b i a ,  . 
encouraced by Ottoman concess ions ,  developed t h e  supra- 
b i . ,  ~ p .  35 f f .  
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n a t i o n a l  and i m p e r i a l i s t i c  concept of a " ~ r e a t e r  ~ e r b i a .  " 1 
Vhen i n  t h e  course  of European p o l i t i c a l  v i c i s s i t u d e s  Se rb  
and Croat  were drawn c l o s e r  and c l o s e r  t o g e t h e r ,  any movement 
d i r e c t e d  toward a "Grea te r  Croa t i an  o r  a "Grea t e r  s e r b i a n  w a s ,  I 
I 
o s t e n s i b l y  a t  l e a s t ,  r e l e g a t e d  t o  a more b a s i c  and fundamental  
pan-Slav i d e a l ,  Yugoslavism. 
The Kingdom of Serbs ,  Croa ts ,  and Slovenes  w a s  pro- 
claimed on December 1, 1918 , l  f u l f i l l i n g  t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  of I 
t h e  Pac t  of ~ o r f u . '  From t h e  very fo rma t ion  of this new s t a t e  
u n t i l  lNorld Bar  11, Yugoslav p o l i t i c s  were " e m e s h e d  i n  a 
t a n g l e  of r e g i o n a l  na t iona l i sms ,  a n t a g o n i s t i c  c reeds ,  and con- ~ 
! 
t r a s t i n g  c u l t u r e s ,  whi le  being f a c e d  a t  t h e  same t i m e w i t h  
e x a s p e r a t i n g  economic and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  problems. 11 3 
The most apparen t  of t he se  i n t e r n a l  d i f f e r e n c e s  and 
t h e  crwc of Yunos lav ia ' s  p o l i t i c a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  was t h e  con- 
f l i c t  between h e r  two l a r y e s t  e t h n i c  ~ r o u p s .  The Serbs ,  s t i l l  1 
1 
dreaminc of a "Grea te r  Se rb i a , "  exhor t ed  c e n t r s l i z a t i o n ;  t h e  
I 
l ~ h e  name w a s  o f f  i c i a l l p  changed t o  Yugoslavia on 
October 3, 1929. 
~ o h n  Cl in ton  Adams, "Serb ia  i n  t h e  F i r s t  Ror ld  Ear,"' I 
Y u ~ o s l a v i a ,  2. a., pp. 88-89 : " Conferences between t h e  
Se rb l an  Csbinet  an2 t h e  l e a d e r s  of t h e  Yu_roslav C o n ~ i t t e e  r e -  i 
s u l t e d  i n  the  Pact  of Corfu, s i e e d  on J u l y  20, 1917. . . . 
Thi s  document a f f i r m e d  t h e  u n i t y  of Serbs ,  Croats,  and Slove- 
n e s  and d e c l a r e d  t h a t  a l l  branches of t h e  South  S l a v i c  r ace ,  
i n c l u d i n ~  t!ontene~ro, should form a s i n ~ l e  kincdom, on a,con- 
s t l t u t i o n a l  and democrat ic  bas i s ,  under t h e  Karayeorcevic 
dynas ty .  Local  autonomies, de l imi t ed  by l n a t u r a l ,  s o c i a l ,  and 
economic c o n d i t i o n s , '  would be provided f o r  i n  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  
of t h e  kinrdom." 
' ~ o s e ~ h  S. Roucek, Falkan P o l i t i c s  : I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
l a t i o n s  i n  KO ?.ianl s Land ( ~ h n f  or6,  " a l i f  o r n i a  : Stsnl'orC 
I l n t v e r s l t y  P re s s ,  194:>), o. 98. 
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Croats ,  fewer i n  number, advocated federalism.' This c o n f l i c t  
I 
reached a climax i n  1928, when, i n  t h e  par l iamentary  chambers, 
~ u n i g a  Ra6i6, a Serb Deputy shot  and k i l l e d  t h e  l e a d e r  of t h e  I 
Croa t ian  Peasants1  Party,  S t jepan  adi id, and two of h i s  
col leagues ,  and wounded two o the r s .  This shocking i n c i d e n t  
and t h e  alarming domestic s i t u a t i o n  l e d  t o  t h e  es tabl i shment  
of King Alexanderls d i c t a t o r s h i p .  A d i c t a t o r s h i p  which w a s  
t o  las t ,  i n  modified form, u n t i l  World War 11 .~  I 1 A l l  i n  a l l .  
se l f -de terminat ion  i s  an unfor tunate  formula f o r  sou theas te rn  
Europe. Xutual  to lerance  would be a b e t t e r  one .n3 
The continued maneuvering f o r  p o l i t i c a l  p o s i t i o n  by 
these  " o l d  f a c t i o n s  i n  new cownsw and t h e  enphasis on r e g i o n a l  
o r i e n t a t i o n  i n s t e a d  of n a t i o n a l  problems s e r i o u s l y  burdened 
t h e  f l e d g l i n g  covernment which, consequently, experienced a 
cont inuous s e r i e s  o f  cabine t  c r i s e s  .4 Roucek, d i scuss ing  the 
c a b i n e t  c r i s e s  dur ine  Yugoslavia's f i rs t  decade, s t a t e s :  
The turnover  amounted t o  130 cab ine t  pos ts .  Ten 
c a b i n e t s  l a s t e d  only a few months each;  no more t h a n '  
two succeeded i n  remaining i n  o f f i c e  f o r  the  m c o r d  of 
e leven months. Other governments w r e  i n  o f f i c e  f o r  
only  one month, and even two weeks. 8 
l ~ b l d . ,  p .  87. 
~ c % r n a r d  Newman, Balkan Background (h'sw York: The 
Tdacmillan Co., 1915),  pp. 1%-131. The author ,  i n  d i scuss ing  
t h e  Y u ~ o s l a v  p o l i t i c a l  dilemqa, remarics : "The Croats made 
t h e  s u r p r i s i n c  discovery t h a t  they were outnumbered-- t h e r e  
were s ix  m i l l i o n  Serbs and only th ree  m i l l i o n  Croats and 
Slovenes. Thus, the  Serbs could always outvote  the  Croats 
and Slovenes. One would have imaeined t h a t  this  m i @ t  have 
been foreseen!  Further ,  by a weird e l e c t o r a l  law t3-pica1 of 
tho  P a l h n s ,  a p a r t y  which pol led  one-half of the t o t a l  votes  
roceivod 75 percent  of the  sea ts . "  
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I n  1934 King Alexander was a s s a s s i n a t e d ,  a f a t e  not  
uncommon among Balkan p o l i t i c i a n s .  The new King of t h e  
Yugoslavs was P e t e r  11, a c h i l d  of e leven;  t h e  regency was 
headed by Prince Paul ~ a r a ~ e o r g e v i d .  Under Paul, t he  d ic-  
t a t o r s h i p  was continued, but i n  a more moderate form. And 
t o  t h e  n o r t h  a d i c t a t o r s h i p  of y e t  ano the r  degree was t a k i n g  
shape i n  Germany. 
A t  the  o u t s e t  of 1:Jorld War 11, Yugoslavia w a s  i n  an 
extremely unenviable pos i t ion .  Des t ruc t ion  of t h e  L i t t l e  
Entente ,  of which she was a member, was a n  important aim of 
1 German f o r e i g n  pol icy.  I t a l y ,  a t r a d i t i o n a l  r i v a l ,  w a s  
determined t o  e n c i r c l e  Yugoslavia t o  prevent any t h r e a t  t o  
I t a l i a n  A d r i a t i c  supremacy. "Disruption from wi th in  and 
dismemberment from outs ide  seemed t o  be the  purpose behind 
I t a l i a n  pol icy  t o  Y u ~ o s l a v i a .  "2 E u n ~ a r y ,  Bulgaria,  and Al- 
bania had t e r r i t o r i a l  claims and were anxious f o r  h e r  dismem- 
berment, and her  rai lways were e s s e n t i a l  f o r  a success fu l  . 
a t t a c k  on Greece. 
?toreover, Germany had an economic s t r ang leho ld  on 
Y u ~ o s l a v i a .  I n  1938 the % m a n  share i n  Yugoslav expor ts  
3 
was 42 percent  and i n  imports over 39 percent .  This  s i t u -  
a t i o n  became worse when I t a l y  entered  the  war and, wi th  t h e  
invas ion  of Albania, e f f e c t i v e l y  cu t  o f f  the  A d r i a t i c  coas t  
f rm the  A l l i e s .  
3~eton-\v!atson, l a s t  European Revolution, p. 51  
2 ~ b i d .  - 
' ~ 0 ~ 0  Tomasevich, "Poreicn Economic Relat ions,  1918- 
1941," Y u c o s l ~ v i ~ ,  2. G., p. 212. 
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Prince Paul ' s  government was despera te ly  a f r a i d  of 
I 
Germany. A t  t he  same time, any determinat ion it might have I 
had t o  r e s i s t  Nazi demands w a s  weakened by Nazi and C m u n i s t  
propaganda a c t i v i t i e s .  Rhen, i n  hiarch 1941, H i  t l e r  demanded I 
I 
I 
t h a t  Yugoslavia join the  T r i p a r t i t e  Pact, thus f r e e i n g  Germany1 s 
right f l a n k  i n  prepara t ion  f o r  the  a t t a c k  on Russia, Pr ince  
Paul acquiesced.  1 
I 
On March 25, 1941, Yugoslavia s igned the  T r i p a r t i t e  
Pac t .  Popular r eac t ion  w a s  immediate. A r e v o l t  l e d  by t h e  
Serbian  element of the  army and supported by the  P a t r i a r c h  
overthrew t h e  government. The Regent and governmental I 
o f f i c i a l s  were placed i n  custody, and seventeen-year-old 
I King Pe te r  I1 assumed f u l l  royal  powers. 
Thus, on March 27, 1941, "Ehe Yugoslav n a t i o n  found 
I 









'~oucek,  x. G., p. 106- 
Z W i n s t o n  S. Churchi l l ,  i n  a speech t o  t h e  Conservative 
Cent ra l  Council, i-arch 27, 1941, quoted by Yr. ~ h u r c h i l l ,  -  he 
Grand Al l iance  (Boston: Hou~hton M i f f l i n  Co., 1950),  p. 163. 
CHAPTER I1 
JOSIP BROZ-- YTJGOSLAV AND COh!?~VJNIST 
.In 1937 one Jos ip  Broz, then known t o  h is  f e l l o w  
Communists a s  "~omrade  \nlalter," was summoned t o  T~ioscow and 
t o l d  of his appointment a s  the new Secretary-General  of t h e  
Communist Par ty  of Yugoslavia (C.P.Y. ) . Since that day he 
has been the  guiding hand of the C.P.Y. Under t h e  name Ti to ,  
ano the r  pa r ty  al ias,  Broz has l e d  Yugoslav Communism through 
the  gamut of revolu t ionary  p o l i t i c a l  expression,  f irst ,  a s  a 
r i g i d l y  suppressed underground movement, second, as a r e s i s -  
tance  movement of h e r o i c  proport ions d i r e c t e d  a g a i n s t  Axis 
domination, t h i r d ,  a s  the  most exemplary of the Sovie t  Sat-  
e l l i t e s ,  and f i n a l l y ,  as the  f i rs t  success fu l  man i fes ta t ion  
of Communist nat ional ism outs ide  of the  U.S .S .R. 
Thus, i n  a remarkably short  tlme Jos ip  Broz-Tito mete- 
ored from complete obscur i ty  t o  a  p o s i t i o n  of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
n rminence  . F i t z r o y  TZaclean, who headed the  Bri t ish  military 
mission t o  T i t o  during YOrld ?Var 11, s t a t e s  t h a t  a s  l a t e  as 
1943, B r i t i s h  i n t e l l i g e n c e  o f f i c e r s  were arguing "whether T i t o  
e x i s t e d  a t  a l l ,  and, i f  so, whether he was a woman o r  a commit- 
1 t e e  ." Put only f i v e  p a r s  l a t e r ,  i n  1948, t h i s  same man was 
t o  amaze the  world by openly defying h i s  fel low comnunists 
and coo l ly  c h a l l e n e i n ~  t h e  pos i t ion  of the Communist behemoth, 
the  Sovie t  Union. H i s  v e q  name had become a p o l i t i c a l  by- 
word i n  the  p r e a t  ideo loq ica l  b a t t l e  sweeping t h e  world. 
l ~ i t  zroy ?.?aclean, Zastern Approaches (London : Cape, 
1949) ,  p. 309, quoted i n  Lel:-!l ':;bite, l a l k m  Caesar: T i t o  
Versus S t ~ l i n  (Kew York: S h ~ r l o s  Scribnarts Sons, 1951!, p ,  
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T i t o  w a s  born J o s i p  Broz i n  t h e  Croa t i an  v i l l a g e  of 
, 1892. H i s  f a t h e r ,  Fran  jo Broz, w a s  a Croa t ;  
h i s  mother  Mari ja ~ a v e r g e k ,  a Slovene.  T i t o  l i v e d  t h e  t y p i c a l  
f r u g a l  youth  of a Croat peasan t  and r ece ived  l i t t l e  educa t ion .  I 
A t  t h e  aEe f i f t e e n  he  w a s  app ren t i ced  t o  a l o c k m i t h  i n  S i sak ,  
and whi 
movemen 
t h e r e  
Three 
developed h i s  f i r s t  i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  S o c i a l i s t  
y e a r s  l a t e r ,  upon t h e  completion of h i s  
a p p r e n t i c e s h i p ,  he joined t h e  Y e t a l  Workers f Union and t h e  I 
Social -Democrat ic  P a r t y  of Croa t ia  and S lavonia .  I n  T i t o f  s 
words, "It v ~ a s  one of t h e  proudes t  mements of my l i f e .  n l  
Fo r  young Broz 1910 t o  1913 were wanderjahre.  He 
t r a v e l l e d  over  Europe, T r i e s t e ,  Vienna, ?tlunich, P i l s e n ,  t h e  
Ruhr, working a t  va r ious  jobs. I n  1913 he e n t e r e d  t h e  Austro- 
Hungarian army f o r  two y e a r s  o f  compulsory m i l i t a r y  s e r v i c e ,  
S h o r t l y  a f t e r  t h e  ou tbreak  of 7lorld TCar I, T i t o f s  r e g b e n t  
was s e n t  t o  t 3 e  Carps th ians  t o  h a l t  t h e  ,Wssian advance i n  
t h a t  s e c t o r .  " ~ c c o r d i n p  t o  s m e  sources ,  T i t o  p r m ? t l y  de- 
s e r t e d  t o  t h e  3uss ians  ; accord inq  t o  o t h e r s ,  he w a s  captt lred 
d u r i n ?  'a X s s i a n  a t t a c k ,  i n  t h e  course of which he was s e r i o u s l y  
2  
wounded." I n  e i t h e r  event ,  he became a W s s i a n  ;> r i sone r  of 
war. 
In 1917 T i t o  e s c ~ p e d  f r o n  h i s  c a p t o r s  and made h i s  way 
t o  t h e  Russian c a p i t a l ,  S t .  Petersburg,  where he took  p a r t  i n  
t h e  Ju ly  Denons t r s t i ons  a e a i n s t  t h e  p r o v i s i o n a l  c o v e r m e n t .  3 
l ~ l a d i r n i r  Deki je r ,  - T i t o  (Rew York: Simon and Schus t e r ,  
1952)  p. 25. 
2!yhite, 2. c i t . ,  p. 17. Ded i j e r ,  9. s., pp. 34-35, 
c i t e s  T i t o  RS say in-t he was wounded bp a Cl rcas s fan  l a n c e r  
and cap tu red .  
'Dedi j e r ,  9. G., p. 30. 
He jo ined  t h e  Red I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Guard, composed of p r i s o n e r s  
of w a r ,  a t  t h e  t ime of t h e  October Revolution,  b u t  he d i d  n o t  
s e e  any  a c t i o n .  1 
I n  1920 T i t o  r e t u r n e d  t o  h i s  n a t i v e  Croa t i a ,  now p a r t  
of newly formed Yugoslavia.  The same y e a r  he jo ined t h e  
Communist Pa r ty ,  t h u s  beginning a c o n s p i r a t o r i a l  e x i s t e n c e  
that  was t o  last u n t i l  a f t e r  l,Vorld War 11. 
The y e a r  1920 was a s i g n a l  one f o r  Yugoslav Cormnun- 
i s t s .  The C.P.Y. had n o t  come i n t o  be ing  u n t i l  a f t e r  World 
Rar  I, and t h e n  w a s  " l i t t l e  more than  a r e v o l u t i o n a r y  expres -  
2 
s i o n  of and a s p i r a t i o n  f o r  soc i a l i sm and r ad i ca l i smn  It found, 
however, a respons ive  s e p e n t  of t h e  popu la t ion  among Yugo- 
s l a v i a l  s di sconten ted  m i n o r i t i e s .  Following t h e  1920 e l e c -  
t i o n s  t o  t h e  Cons t i t uen t  Assembly, t h e  Communists emerged as 
t h e  t h i r d  s t r o n ~ e s t  p a r t y  i n  t h a t  body, o b t a i n i n g  f i f t y - e i g h t  
of t h e  419 s e a t s .  3 
The c m u n i s t s ~  p o p u l a r i t y  w a s  t o  be s h o r t - l i v e d ,  how- 
e v e r .  I n  1921  t h e  p a r t y  was outlawed fo l luwing  a s e r i e s  of 
t e r r o r i s t i c  a c t s  a e a i n s t  t h e  government, i nc lud ing  t h e  a t tempted  
 dam F. Ulam, Titoism and t h e  Cminf  o m  (Casbridge : 
Harvard U n i v e r s i t y  P re s s ,  1352),  p. 3 .  
3 ~ b i d  * P p. 8: n C h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y ,  i t  won i t s  g rea t -  
e s t  succes ses  i n  two d i s a f f e c t e d  and most backward r ez ions :  
i n  Xontenepro it won 40 percent  and i n  IJacedonia 33 percen t  of  
the s e n t 3  i n  tho  ConstLtuent Assembly. . . . I n  Croa t la  and 
S loven la ,  t h e  two most advanced and i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  prov inces  
where the n a t i o n a l  ~ r o b l e m  was a l s o  impor tan t ,  t h e  Cmmunists  
dlr l ,  p a r s d o x i c a l l y ,  very  poor ly .  S lovenia  and Croa t ia  a r e  of 
course  S ~ t h o l i c ,  and i n  Croat ia  t h e  n a t i o n a l i s t  a s ~ i r a t i o n  
was wo l l  r e p r e s e n t e d  by Radich ts  p r t y .  I1 
a s s a s s i n a t i o n  of Prince Regent Paul and Premier ~ a ~ i c ' a n d  t h e  
murder of Min i s t e r  of the  I n t e r i o r  ~ r a % k o v i c <  Thus, t h e  C.P.Y. 
temporar i ly  ceased t o  be a major f o r c e  i n  Yugoslav p o l i t i c s .  1 
A f t e r  the  Par ty  was outlawed, i t  l e d  a c l andes t ine  
ex i s t ence .  T i t o  moved from job t o  Job, organizing t r a d e  union 
branches and Communist c e l l s .  F i n a l l y ,  he was made s e c r e t a r y  
of the  Metal Workersr Union, so t h a t  he could devote more 
time t o  Pa r ty  l abors .  
Between 1926 and 1928 the  C.P.Y. w a s  t o r n  wi th  f a c t i o n a l  
s t r i f e .  I n  1928 the  Zagreb branch of the  Party,  l e d  by Ti to ,  
went over the  heads of t h e i r  super iors  and appealed d i r e c t l y  
t o  t h e  Camintern t o  end the  f ac t iona l i sm and take  t h e  Yugo- 
s l a v  component i n  hand. 
It i s  l i k e l y  t h a t  the  Zagreb confepence of 1928 and 
i t s  l e t t e r  c rea ted  a good impression i n  ;;Ioscow and drew 
i t s  a t t e n t i o n  t o  the ?remising young Croat Com~unist ,  
who i n s t e a d  of beiw, f l e f t l  o r  f r i g h t 1  want a simply t o  
rece ive  marching orders  from the  Sonintern,  9 
A t  t h e  Four th  Congress of the  C.P.Y., he ld  l a t e r  t h a t  
y e a r  i n  Dresden, Gemany, the Cornintern did,  i n  f a c t ,  take t he  
P a r t y  i n  hand. The Yuposlav Communists were severe ly  taken 
t o  t a s k  by t h e  de legate  of the Third I n t e r n a t i o n a l ,  Comrade 
"Ercol i , "  and new leadersh ip  f o r  the  C.P.Y. was nominated, 
headed by Djuro D jakovic', and inc luding  J o s i p  Broz . " ~ r c o l i ,  
now b e t t e r  known as Palmiro T o c l i a t t i ,  Secretary-General  of the 
' ~ i t o ,  P o l i t i c a l  Report of the  Cent ra l  Corni t tee  of 
t h e  Communist Par ty  of ~ u ~ o s l a v i a ,  % l i v e r e d  a t  the  :-'ifth 
Conprass of the  S..'.Y. (Fe l r rade ,  1949) ,  p. 25, c i t e d  Sp I b i d  
- J p. 9:  In  1923, the  Incbpenaent '::orkersl Par ty  of Yu~oslav:s, 
a Communist " f ron t , "  could muster only 18,000 votes-- a l o s s  
of more than a0  percent  of the Communists1 previous showing 
a t  the  p o l l s .  
2 ~ l a m ,  OJ. G., p .  14 
I t a l i a n  Communist Party,  c a l l e d  f o r  complete and abso lu te  
submission t o  the Third 1 n t e r n a t i o n a l . l  ''The Par ty  func t ion-  
a r i e s  re turned from Dresden more as Soviet  agen t s  than  as 
Yugos l a v  Comrnunis t s  . 11 2 
Unfortunately f o r  Ti to ,  he was not  ab l e  t o  enjoy h i s  
new pos i t i on  f o r  long. He was a r r e s t e d  i n  August, 1928, f o r  
h i s  c o n s p i r a t o r i a l  and subversive a c t i v i t i e s ,  and sentenced 
t o  f i v e  years  i n  pr ison a t  hard l abor .  
T i t o  was f i r s t  sent  t o  Lepo~ lava ,  Croat ia .  There 
he met Mosa P i  jade, h i s  f u t u r e  pa r t i s an  comrade and p o l i t i c a l  
advisor .  Disc ip l ine  a t  Lepoglava was, t o  a l l  appearances, 
no to r ious ly  lax. Tito  and Pijade not  only organized a Party 
c e l l  wi th in  t h e  pr ison walls ,  but  s e t  up a  course of s tudy 
and l e c t u r e s  f o r  the  pr isoners .3  P i  jade even t r a n s l a t e d  - Das 
Kapi ta l  i n t o  ~ e r b o - ~ r o a t . ~  Ultimately,  T i t o  was accused of 
c o n s p i r i n ~  t o  escape and was t r an s f e r r ed  t o  ' laribor,  Slovenia 
" the  worst pr i son  i n  Yuposlavla. "5 
Upon h i s  r e lease  from pr ison i n  1934, T i t o  once aore  
devoted himself t o  Par ty  a c t i v i t i e s ,  3y law he was requi red  
t o  remain In h i s  na t ive  v i l l a g e  of Kmrovec and r epo r t  d a i l y  
t o  the a p p m p r i a t e  a u t h o r i t i e s .  He l e f t  t he  v i l l age ,  hmever ,  
and a warrent was i ssued f o r  h i s  a r r e s t .  T i t o  dyed h i s  h a i r ,  
grew a mustache, assumed a l i a s e s ,  and success fu l ly  eluded the  
po l i ce .  
l ~ b i d . ,  pp. 15  f r .  %bid., p.  l a .  
3 ~ o s i ~  Broz Ti to ,  a s s i s t e d  by Vladimir B d i  jer ,  " ~ i t o  
Speaks," -* Li f e  32 (Apr i l  29, 19521, 67. 
 bid., fn .  
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During T i t o ' s  imprisonment t h e  P a r t y ' s  f o r t u n e s  had 
h a r d l y  improved. A f t e r  t h e  es tab l i shment  of King Alexander'  s [ 1 
d i c t a t o r s h i p  i n  1929, a  new wave of Communist r e p r e s s i o n  
swept t h e  country .  ~ j a k o v i ;  had d ied  i n  j a i l ,  a l l e g e d l y  
a f t e r  hav ing  been t o r t u r e d  by p o l i c e  .' The remaining lead-  
e r s  f l e d  t h e  country  and headquar tered i n  Vienna. 
T i t o  endeavored t o  r e e s t a b l i s h  s t r o n g  p a r t y  l e a d e r s h i p  
. .  I 
and,  because of h i s  e f f o r t s ,  he  became i n c r e a s i n g l y  more prom- 
' I 
i n e n t  i n  t h e  Pa r ty  organiza t ion .  I n  December 1934, he w a s  
- I 
e l e c t e d  t o  the  Cen t r a l  Committee of t h e  C.P.Y., and the  next 
month he  was nominated f o r  membership i n  t h e  Balkan Secre- 
t a r ia t  of the Cornintern. l7,hen accepted,  he  l e f t  b e d i a t e l y  I 
f o r  P!loscow. 
T i t o  s t ayed  i n  Y?oscow u n t i l  1936, as a member of t h e  
I ' I 
Balkan S e c r e t a r i a t  and r appor t eu r  f o r  Yugoslavia. He a l s o  
d e l i v e r e d  l e c t u r e s  on t r a d e  union m a t t e r s  a t  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  : I 
L e n i n i s t  School and a t  t h e  Communist Un ive r s i t y  of t h e  
R a t i o n a l  l .7 inor i t ies  i n  t h e  '!lest (ICLTLVZ). Ul t imate ly ,  he was 
s e n t  back t o  E lu~os l av i a  t o  head t h e  Pa r ty  o rgan iza t ion  w i t h i n  
t h e  countrg .  ~o rk i c ' ,  t h e  Secretary-General  of t h e  C.P.Y., 
went t o  P a r i s  t o  s e t  up new Cent ra l  Committee headquar te rs .  
On l e a v i n g  Russia, T i t o  w a s  a l s o  given t h e  t a s k  of 
o r ~ a n i z i n g  and mobi l iz ing  Yuroslav vo lun tee r s  f o r  t h e  Spanish 
C i v i l  !Var. He appa ren t ly  d id  a c r e d i t a b l e  job, f o r  the  Y q o -  
- 
s l a v s  were t h e  most numerous of the Balkan vo lun tee r s .  2 
About one thousand f i v e  hundred Yugoslavs, inc lud ing  
mans i n t e l l e c t u a l s .  were s e n t .  The l o s s e s  su f fe red  b s  I 
t h e V ~ u g o s l a v s  i n  ~ b a i n  were extremely heavy: Almost - 
h a l f  of them were k i l l e d ,  t h r e e  hundred were wounded, 
and t h r e e  hundred and f i f t y  in te rned  i n  concent ra t ion  
camps near  the French f r o n t i e r  a f t e r  the  co l l apse  of I 
Spain. Of t hese ,  about t h r e e  hundred managed t o  escape 
and ge t  t o  ~ u g o s l a v i a ,  where they l a t e r  fought i n  the- 
war. 
I 
It was these  ve terans  of the Spanish C i v i l  '?!ar t h a t  
provided the  cadres  f o r  Ti tot  s Pa r t i sans .  Indeed, s o  many of 
them continue t o  hold high o f f i c e  i n  Yugoslavia 's  mili tary 
and government, t h a t  they have became known i n  Belgrade as 
the  "Spanish n o b i l i t y .  n2 
By 1937 the  i n t e r n a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  of the  C.P.Y. had 
become s o  pronounced t h a t  the  Soviet  Union, i n  the  o f f i c i a l  
guise  of the  Comintern, decided t o  end the f ac t iona l i sm once 
and f o r  a l l .  The e n t i r e  leadership  of the  C.P.Y., wi th  one 
e 
I 
except ion,  was purged. The one except ion was Jos ip  Broz, o r  1' 
"Comrade Y a l t e r , "  who was designated Secretary-General of 3 a 
t 
t h e  Par ty .  I n  1939 i t  was announced t h a t  a number of the  I 
m 
former l eader s ,  inc lud inc  ~ork5.6,  Sima ~ a r k o v i 6 ,  Anton Yavrak, I 
Jovan ~..!artinovid, and Djuro ~ v i j i 6 ,  had been excluded from the  ! 
# 
The l a s t  v e s t i c e s  of p r e - S t a l i n i s t  C m u n i s n  were b I
I 
r a p i d l y  disappearing;  the Party was rap id ly  becoming one of i 
younR men. 
Adam Ulam s t a t e s  : 
l ~ e d i  je r ,  2. G., p. 113 
' ~ l e x a n d e r  Rankovic, Report of the  Central  Corni t tee  
of the  Communist Party of Yucoslavia on the  Crganlzat lonal  
!';ark of tho T.P.Y., presentee?, a t  the i < ' i f t l ~  S o n - ~ e s s  o:' t h e  
C . i a . Y .  ( l !c : :L~ru~lo ,  1910),  p. 5, c i t e d  by Clam, CIJ. G., 3.  23. 
He r ~ > t o y  had l i t e r a l l y  t o  s t e p  over  t h e  bodies  of 
many of h i s  p redecessors ,  i n  f u l l  knowledge that  t h e  
p o l i t i c a l  l i f e - s p a n  of t h e  l e a d e r  of t h e  Communist P a r t y  
of Yugoslavia was, a s  a r u l e ,  ve ry  s h o r t  anc  unp lea san t .  
H i s  p r edeces so r s  had e i t h e r  been l i q u i d a t e d  o r  had l e d  
a wretched e x i s t e n c e ,  abused a t  every  occasion,  i n t e r -  
m i t t e n t l y  thrown ou t  of t hen  readmi t ted  i n t o  t he  Pa r ty ,  
and y e t  i n  many.cases  unable t o  d ivorce  themselves com- 
p l e t e l y  from what had been t h e i r  e n t i r e  l i f e .  Had he 
n o t  been a Communist f a n a t i c  i n  1937, T i t o  could n o t  
have helped knowing that  any major  s h i f t  i n  t h e  p o l i c y  
of t h e  Cornintern o r  t he  l i q u i d a t i o n  of one of h is  Russian 
p r o t e c t o r s  w a s  l i k e l y  t o  mean f o r  him the  f a t e  of ?!blan 
Gorkich o r  Sima 1~7arkovich.l 
T i t o  and his  subord ina tes  s e t  t o  work r e b u i l d i n g  t h e  
s h a t t e r e d  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e  of ' the  C.P.Y. and e s t a b -  
l i s h i n g  P a r t y  u n i t y .  Pa r ty  a c t i v i t i e s  were i n c r e a s e d  i n  
a r e a s  where Communist appea l  w a s  weak, p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  Croa t i a  
and S lovenia ,  and new programs of p o l i t i c a l  i n d o c t r i n a t i o n  
were begun. Numerically, however, t h e  Comrnunis t P a r t y  remained 
s m a l l ,  numbering about  12,000 i n  1 9 4 1 . ~  
But T i t o  and h i s  l i e u t e n a n t s  acqu i r ed  i n  t h e  y e a r s  
from 1937 t o  1941 a s s e b m o r e  va luab le  t o  C m u n i s t s  tlmn 
popula r  suppor t  : t hey  acqui red  t h e  "cadres,I t  a body of 
exper ienced  and w e l l  t r a i n e d  fo l l ower s  who, f o r  once, 
were n o t  s p l i t  i n t o  innumerable f a c t i o n s  and groups. A t  
eve ry  l e v e l  of Yugoslav s o c i e t y  and i n  every  n a t i o n a l i t y  
t h e  ? a r t y  had a Proup of suppor t e r s  which, i n  a c r i s i s ,  
cou ld  be counted upon t o  provide the  e l i t e  of a revolu-  
t i o n a r y  movement .3 
It w a s  a l s o  i n  1937 t h a t  J o s i p  Broz began t o  use t h e  
pseudonym " ~ i t o "  exc lus ive ly .  T i t o  was a  name c m o n  i n  his 
n a t i v e  Croa t ian  d i s t r i c t  of Z a ~ o r j e ,  and had no p a r t i c u l a r  
s i g n i f i c a n c e  beyond conceal ing his r e a l  i d e n t i t y .  It was only 
chance t h a t  made T i t o  t h e  name under which Sroz should become 
2 ~ a m i l t o n  F i s h  A n n s t r o n ~ ,  T i t o  and Go l i a th  (Sea York: 
The hTacrnillan Co., 1951) ,  p. 40. 
famous, f o r  during h i s  l i f e ,  he has  employed a myriad of 
a l i a s e s  : ~ l i ~ o r i  j e v i 6  Zagorac, J i rechek,  Walter, Kekas, 
~ o s t a n j g e k ,  ~ a b i l ,  and Karlsson among them. I 
From 1937 t o  1939 the  C.P.Y. devoted much of i t s  en- 
ergy t o  opposing the  ever-growing t h r e a t  of Fascisn. Then, i n  
1939, came t h e  s igning  of the  Russo-German Mon-Amsfon  Pact .  
The Yugoslav Communists, imi ta t ing  the  astounding reve r sa l  
executed by t h e i r  Soviet  comrades, became conspicuously s i l e n t .  
No l e s s  an  a u t h o r i t y  than Ti to  himself says:  "VJe accepted t h e  
pac t  l i k e  d i sc ip l ined  Communists, considering i t  necessary 
f o r  t h e  s e c u r i t y  of the  Soviet  Union, a t  that t h e  the  only 
S o c i a l i s t  s t a t e  i n  the world.n2 
Even the  coup dfeftat  of March 27, 1941, l e d  by General 
~ imovic /  and h i s  Serbian o f f i c e r s ,  received no support from the 
C.P.Y. Shor t ly  a f t e r  the coup, T i to  drew up the  following 
order  : 
1. The Yugoslav Comunist Party i s  now i n  a pos i t ion  
t o  take an a c t i v e  pa r t  i n  overthrowing the  present  
monarchial regime, and t o  t h i s  end w i l l  render a s s i s -  
tance t o  a l l  elements, regardless  of t h e i r  idea logi -  
c a l  outlook and charac ter ,  who a r e  bent on the sane 
purpose. . . . 
2. Party members who a r e  mobilized w i l l  have the  follow- 
ing  tasks  t o  perform: f i r s t ,  t o  disorganize t h e  re- 
s i s t a n c e  of the Yup,oslav army by c rea t ing  confusion 
among o f f i c e r s  and men, so  t h a t  defea t  appears t o  be 
the r e s u l t  of the incompetence of the  o f f i c e r  corps, 
whose a u t h o r i t y  w i l l  be destroyed once and f o r  a l l ;  
and, second, t o  c o l l e c t  a l l  arms and e q n i p e n t  t h a t  
may be thrown away i n  panic and convey them t o  safe  
h id ing  places f o r  l a t e r  use. . . . 
3. Render a l l  n e c e s s a q  ass i s t ance  t o  the  Ustasha. . . 
and o the r  s e p a r a t i s t  o r ~ a n i z a t i o n s ,  i n  so  f a r  a s  they 
'Dedljer, 9. s., passim. 
c o n t r i b u t e  t o  t h e  speedy overthrow of the  r ~ i m o v i d  
regime. Help should a l s o  be g iven  t o  t h e  iiontene- 
g r i n  s e p a r a t i s t s  i f  they  adopt an  a n t i - R o y a l i s t  
l i n e .  . . . 
4. Germany w i l l  s p e e d i l y  c rush  Yugoslav f e s i s t a n c e  
and, w i t h  t h e  he lp ,  of I t a l y ,  w i l l  i n t roduce  t h e  
Ustasha regime i n  Croa t ia  and . . . s i m i l a r  separ -  
a t i s t  regimes e lsewhere ,  S teps  must t h e r e f o r e  be 
taken  t o  i n f i l t r a t e  our  own people i n t o  t h e  new 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s  f o r  i n t e l l i g e n c e  and o t h e r  purposes.  1 
Not much na t iona l i sm i n  19411 
-- -- 
The German b l i t k r i e g  h i t  Yugoslavia on A p r i l  6, 1941; 
s t i l l  t h e  Communists d i d  nothing.  Post-1948 p r o t e s t a t i o n s  t o  
t h e  con t r a ry ,  i t  was no t  u n t i l  June 22, t h e  i nvas ion  of Russia,  
that  t h e  Yugoslav Communists took up arms a g a i n s t  t he  Axis 
i nvade r s .  2 
U n t i l  then  they  were ready t o  sabotage and o b s t r u c t  
and i n f i l t r a t e  t h e  puppet regimes i n  Yugoslavia, j u s t  
as they  had done w i t h  every  g o v e n n e n t  i n  Yugoslavia 
s i n c e  t h e  coun t ry ' s  i ncep t ion ,  bu t  a f t e r  t h a t  they  were 
ready t o  r i s k  a l l  and t o  i v e  a l l  i n  t h e i r  m e a s u r e d  
l o y a l t y  t o  Sov ie t  -3ussi.a. 9 
The Axis onslaught  crushed Yugoslavia and t h e  country  
was p a r t i t i o n e d  among Germany and h e r  s a t e l l i t e s ,  I t a l y ,  Run- 
p a w ,  and R u l ~ a r i a  . Croat ia  became a n  " independent s t a t e "  
under t h e  Q u i s l i n g  government of Ante ~ a v e l i g ,  w i t h  a member 
of t h e  I t a l i a n  Royal House as king. Resis tance was M e d i a t e .  
Rep;ular army u n i t s ,  who had escaped t o  t he  mountains, and 
l o c a l  armed bands began t o  ha ra s s  t he  enemy. 
A f t e r  t h e  a t t a c k  on Russia, t he  Communists organized 
q u i c k l y ,  forming i n t o  armed u n i t s ,  and c a l l i n g  themselves 
'stephen C l i s so ld ,  V h i r l r i n d :  An Account of i l a r s h a l l  
T i t o t  s Rise t o  Power (New York: P l ~ i l i s o p h i c a l  Libr-sry, 19491, 
p .  27, quoted by i'ihite, 9. e., p. 34. 
23ee Ulam, z. e., p. 26-27. 
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P a r t i s a n s .  The dramat ic  s t o r y  that  fol lowed i s  well-known. 
T i t o ,  ignored  by t h e  A l l i e d  Powers, even Russia,  welded t o -  
I I 
g e t h e r  h i s  Communist l e d  "Nat iona l  L i b e r a t i o n  F ron t ,  " and 
1 I 
conducted a  vigorous  r e s i s t a n c e  movement. H ~ d r e d s  of thou- 
' I  
sands  of Yugoslavs were a t t r a c t e d  t o  h i s  cause,  and t h e i r  
I  
g a l l a n t  s t r u g g l e  a g a i n s t  t h e i r  conquerors won f o r  them t h e  I 
suppor t  of t h e  A l l i e s .  General ~ r a z a  ~ i h a i l o v i c / ,  War M i n i s t e r  I 
of t h e  Yugoslav government-in-exile and l e a d e r  of t h e  Chetniks,  I 
a r e v i v a l  r e s i s t a n c e  army, was d i s c r e d i t e d .  T i t o  and t h e  I 
Communists were on t h e i r  way t o  power. 1 
I n  1942 t h e  An t i -Fasc i s t  Council f o r  t h e  Nat iona l  
L i b e r a t i o n  of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ)  was c r e a t e d  as a f r o n t  f o r  
t h e  P a r t i s a n  movement. Although the  AVNOJ contained l a r g e  
'1t i s  no t  t h e  purpose of t h i s  study t o  d i s c u s s  o r  
ana lyze  t h e  a r , n v e n t s  involved i n  t h e  Tito-:.!ihailovi6 contro-  
versy .  However, a n  e x p l a n a t y  note i s  warranted.  
Col. ~ r a i a  7+lihailovic, a Yugoslav army o f f i c e r ,  had 
suppor ted  t h e  Simovic' cou i n  1941 and, a f t e r  t h e  German in -  + vas ion ,  w a s  one of t h e  r s t  t o  organize  an e f f e c t i v e  r e s i s -  
t ance  novement . r.lihailovic', ti Serb,  l e d  a pu re ly  Serb ian  
movement, whi le  T i  t o ,  through the  Communist Par ty  o r s a n i z a t i o n ,  
l e d  a movement encompassing every n a t i o n a l  and e t h n i c  group 
and a c t i v e  i n  every  p a r t  of t h e  country.  A t  t h e  beeinning 
of t h e  w a r ,  the  A l l i e s  supported ~ . l i ha i lov i c '  and h i s  Chetnfks;. 
I n  1943, however, a i d  was withdrawn due t o  r e c o p i t i o n  of 
T i t o ' s  P a r t i s a n s  as the  major r e s i s t a n c e  f o r c e ,  and evidence,  
r e a l  o r  a l l e ~ e d ,  of Chetnik c o l l a b o r a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  Axis. 
!.:ihailovic' was captured by P a r t i s a n  t roops  i n  ::arch 
1946. I n  J u l y  of that  year ,  he was t r i e d  f o r  high t reason ,  
found c u i l t y ,  a$ condenned t o  dea th .  On Ju ly  17,  1946, 
ilraz'a : . : ihai lovic  was s h o t ;  a  t r a g i c  end f o r  a man who defen6ed 
h i s  count ry .  
For t h e  ?,:ihailovid ve r s ion  of th i s  controversy,  see - - -  
David ? J a r t i n ,  Al ly  Fetrayed: The Uncensored S tory  of T i t o  
and ~ : i h ~ l l o v i c h  (;;'ew T o r k :  Frentice-: :al l ,  1946) ; f o r  tile 
':onn:uni.st vers'Lon, m d i j e r ,  9. e. For a s h o r t  d i spass ion-  
ate account  of t h e  Yuyoslav r e s i s t a n c e  movements, see Seton- 
'{!atson, The East European Revolution, pp. 119-131. 
numbers of non-Communists, i n  a c t u a l i t y ,  i t  was c o n t r o l l e d  
by t h e  c.P.Y.' One yea r  l a t e r ,  the  A V N O J  became t h e  a c t i n g  
government i n  t he  t e r r i t o r y  he ld  by t h e  P a r t i s a n s ,  and Ydng 
P e t e r  and t h e  government-in-exile were advised  no t  t o  r e t u r n  
t o  Yugoslavia wi thout  the  people.  2 
By t h e  summer of 1944 most of t h e  mountain and f o r e s t  
r eg ions  of Yugoslavia were i n  t h e  possess ion  of T i t o ' s  p a r t i -  
sans .  S e r b i a ,  Macedonia, Vo jvodina, and most of Bosnia and 
Dalmatia were l i b e r a t e d  i n  t he  autwnn of 1944, and t h e  n o r t h  
and west  i n  May 1 9 4 5 . ~  A s  the  Sovie t  army pushed n e s t ,  T i t o  
ob ta ined  a mi l i t a ry -d ip loma t i c  concession that  i n  l a t e r  y e a r s  
was t o  have profound repercuss ions .  The Sov ie t  news agency 
Tass  announced on September 29, 1944 : 
-
A few days ago the  Sov ie t  High C m a n d  approached 
ATJ?:OJ an4 t h e  High C m a n d  of the  Yugoslav People 's  
Army of L i b e r a t i o n  with  a reques t  t o  p e r n i t ,  i n  t he  
i n t o r e s t  of a c t i o n  a g a i n s t  t h e  Geman and Eungarian 
l ~ e e   lam, . G., p. 33 f .  Amstrong,  9. G,, I 
p. 22-23, s t a t e s :  %hourh T i t o  was f r a n k l y  a Comunis t ,  and 
though h i s  men wore the  red s tar  on t h e i r  caps,  he dep rec i a t ed  




t a t o r s h i p .  Sven had he no t  seen t h e  wisdom of t h i s  h imse l f ,  b 
he would havs fol lowed i n s t r u c t i o n s  t o  t h a t  e f f e c t  from S t a l i n ,  b 
who d e s i r e d  t o  avoid offending E r i t i s h  and American a e a o c r a t i c  I 
s u s e p t i b i l i t i e s ,  I n  any event,  P a v i l i c h f  s fawning dependence I 
on H i t l e r  and : , ;ussolini  made i t  not  too hard f o r  p a t r i o t s  t o  
persuade themselves t h a t ,  bp comparison, T i t o ' s  l i n k s  w i t h  
Xoscow were unimportant.  ;.:oreover, t h e r e  s t i l l  l i n g e r e d  i n  
Croa t i a ,  and even more i n  S:ontenegro and Serb ia ,  s t r a i n s  of 
n ine t een th -cen tu ry  Pan-Slavian, t h e  e f f e c t  of which was t o  
surround 1-ssia-- any Russia-- wi th  a rosy  au ra  and t o  make 
a s s o c i a t i o n  w i t h  he r ,  r e e a r d l e s s  of any s o c i a l  t h e o r i e s  i n -  
volved, more a t t r a c t i v e  than  wi th  any o t h e r    at ion." 
3~eton-inlatson,  The S a s t  European Revolution, p. 219. 
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t r o o p s  i n  Hungary, t h e  temporary c r o s s i n g  of S o v i e t  
u n i t s  i n t o  Yugoslav t e r r i t o r y  a d j a c e n t  t o  t h e  Hungarian 
border.  The Sov ie t  High Command l e t  i t  be h o w n  a t  t h e  
same t ime t h a t  t h e s e  u n i t s  would be withdrawn from Yugo- 
s l a v i a  a f t e r  t h e  f u l f i l m e n t  of t h e i r  o p e r a t i v e  t a s k s .  
A V N O J  and t h e  Yugoslav H i p a  Command expressed t h e i r  r e a d i -  
n e s s  t o  a c c e p t  t he  r eques t  of t h e  Sov ie t  X i &  Command. 
The Sov ie t  Hich Command on i t s  s i d e  accep ted  t h e  condi- 
t i o n  l a i d  down by the  Yugoslav s i d e  t h a t  the  c i v i l  admin- 
i s t r a t i o n  of AVI:OJ i n  t h e  Yucoslav d i s t r i c t s  e n t e r e d  by 
Sov ie t  t roops would remain untouched where i t  e x i s t s  
and would be in t roduced where i t  l o e s  no t  y e t  e x i s t  .I 
Thus t h e  Sov ie t  army found i t s e l f  i n  t h e  unique pos i -  
t i o n  of suppor t ing  the  P a r t i s a n  " l i b e r a t o r , "  r a t h e r  than  be- 
i n g  t h e  " l i b e r a t o r . "  
By t h e  end of 1944 Belgrade w a s  occupied by t h e  Par- 
t i s a n s .  The AVNOJ w a s  renamed t h e  People1 s  Front .  T i to ,  as 
a c t i n g  Prime I J i n i s t e r  went through the  motions of compromise 
w i t h  t h e  government-in-exile, and i n  March 1945, even accep ted  
some of i t s  members i n t o  h i s  government. A s  T i t o  s t a t e d :  "Vie 
had t o  consen t  t o  t h i s  agreement because t h e  g e s t e r n  A l l i e s  
s tubborn ly  i n s i s t e d  on it.n2 It was no t  f o r  long.  Other 
p a r t i e s  were no t  p e m i t t e d  t o  organize ,  oppos i t i on  papers were 
s u p ~ r e s s e d ,  and j u s t  p r i o r  t o  the  ?Tovember e l e c t i o n  253,000 
3 persons  were d i s f r a n c h i s e d .  
By t h e  end of 1945 Yueoslavia was i n  t h e  hands of 
t he  Communists. Behind the  t h i n  v e i l  of t h e  Peop le l s  Front  
l ~ r a n z  Borkenau European Z~mmunism (New York : 
Harper 6c Brothers ,  19531, p .  393. The a u t h o r ' s  i t a l i c s .  
2 ~ i t o ,  P o l i t i c a l  Report of t h e  Cent ra l  Committee, 
p. 119, quoted by U l a m ,  2. G., P. 54. 
3Seton-~a tson ,  The East  European Revolution, p. 221. . 
t h e  P.Y. mon 
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i t i c a l  power. Communist s o c i a l  
and economic measures were in t roduced  wi th  a speed m a t c h e d  
even in  those  c o u n t r i e s  under d i r e c t  Soviet c n n t r o l -  1 
T i t  ~niam had 

On June 28, 1948 t h e  Czech newspaper Rude Pravo 
c a r r i e d  a Corninform cornunique announcing t h e  expuls ion  of 
t h e  Communist P a r t y  of ~ u ~ o s l a v i a  .' The wes te rn  world w a s  
e l e c t r i f i e d .  The u n i t y  of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  Communism, Nikola i  I 
Bukharinl  s l 'spontane R e a l i t a t  ,11 w a s  s h a t t e r e d .  2 .  
U n t i l  t h a t  f a t e f u l  day i n  1948, most f o r e i g n  observers  
had cons idered  Y q o s l a v i a  a s  t h e  most exemplary of t h e  Sov ie t  
 satellite^.^ No o t h e r  s a t e l l i t e  could boas t  a comparable I 
w a r  r e c o r d ;  no o t h e r  could boas t  a l lpopularn  r e v o l u t i o n  and  
t 
t h e  e s t ab l i shmen t  of a  Cornmunis t government without o u t s i d e  L u
# 
h e l p ;  and no o t h e r  had a t t a c k e d  t h e  post-war t a s k s  of s o c i a l -  II 
t 
k 
i z a t i o n  and c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n  w i th  more energy,  more v igor ,  1 
nore  r e v o l u t i o n a q  f e r v o r  than  had Yugoslavia.  
. I n  r e t r o s p e c t ,  observers  wondered why they  had n o t  
been a b l e  t o  n o t i c e  t h e  impending c r i s i s .  A f t e r  t h e  break,  
i t  was concluded t h a t  c racks  had begun t o  appear  i n  t h e  
'seton-l!!atson, The Eas t  European Revolution,  p. 224. 
2 ~ ~ a m i l t o n  F i s h  Amstronp; s t a t e s  t h a t  i n  1936 Bukharin 
t o l d  him t h e  u n i t y  and harmony of Communist s o c i e t y  were no t  
t heo ry ,  but I1eine spontane ~ e a l i t a t l l - -  Ira spontanious  f a c t  ." (0. G., p . m  
3 ~ b l d . ,  p.  88: Annstronp: s t a t e s  t h a t  " a l e r t n  Aqerican 
h b a s s g  o f ' : ' l c i a l s  i n  Felcrade had p red i c t ed  what would ha?pen 
two weeks before  news of t he  break became pub l i c  and had r e -  
p o r t e d  t h e i r  su sp i c ions  t o  t he  S t a t e  Department. 
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Communist monol i th  a s  e a r l y  as 194'6, o r  perhaps e a r l i e r .  
Publ ished d ip lomat ic  correspondence w a s  l a t e r  t o  prove t h e  
v a l i d i t y  of t h i s  deduct ion.  
What had caused t h i s  i n c r e d i b l e  b reak  w i t h i n  t h e  
Communist fami ly?  Had Russia planned i t  thus?  Had Yugoslavia? 
If n o t ,  who had e r r e d ?  And h-ow had ind iv idua l i sm and indepen- 
dence, which had long  s ince  ceased t o  e x i s t  i n  t h e  S o v i e t  
Union, been a b l e  t o  surv ive  and exp res s  i t s e l f  i n  a s a t e l l i t e ?  
\Thatever t h e  answers,  "world Communism w i l l  never  a g a i n  be 
q u i t e  t h e  same. n l  
Pos t-War Yugoslavia 
Yugoslavia a t  t h e  end of !Vorld Tar  I1 occupied a 
p o s i t i o n  of primacy among t h e  Sovie t  s a t e l l i t e s .  T i to ,  
combining d ip lomat ic  maneuverings and m i l i t a r y  successes ,  
hsd ended t h e  war as a recognized a l l y  of t h e  U.S.S.R. and 
Yugoslavia the  reby escaped Sovie t  occupation,  t h e  only e a s t  
European s t a t e  which can  claim t h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n . 2  I n  A p r i l  
1945, T i t o  v i s i t e d  S t a l i n  i n  ?.:oscow and signed a twenty yea r  
t r e a t y  of f r i e n d s h i p  and mutual a s s i s t a n c e .  Xamilton F i s h  
A m s t r o n ~  c a l l s  t h i s  t r e a t y  " the  zen i th  of t h e i r  co l labora-  
n 3  t i o n .  
' sov ie t  t r oops  were i n  Czechoslovakia f o r  only  one 
y e a r  u n t i l  Xovember 1945. A l t h o u ~ h  t e c h n i c a l l y  t he  Sovie t  
Army t h e r e  was not  considered an  occupat ion f o r c e ,  the  differ- 
ence was semantic r a t h e r  than r e a l .  
3 ~ n n s t r o n C ,  9. G., p.  47. 
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Although the  1945 t r e a t y  may have been the "zeni th ,"  
f r i e n d l y  r e l a t i o n s  between the two count r ies  and Yu&oslavial s 
pre-eminence i n  the  Balkan a rea  continued. I n  December 1946, 
a Pan-Slav Congress met i n  Eelgrade. There, t h e  Y u ~ o s l a v s  
anC idarshal l  T i t o  received "the highest  considerat ion,  second 
only t o  t h a t  of Russia and Tzarshall S t a l i n .  Even a s  l a t e  
a s  1947 and the c rea t ion  of the Corninform, " the  C.P.Y. was 
t r e a t e d  as the  f i r s t  anong the Comunist P a r t i e s  outs ide  
the  Soviet  Union, desp i t e  the f a c t s  t h a t  fron t h e  point  of 
viev: of population Yugoslavia i s  f a r  behind Toland and t h a t  
h e r  economic importance i s  hardly equal t o  t h a t  of Czechoslo- 
- 
vakia,  Poland, o r  even m a n i a .  11 2 
Unquestionably, Yugoslavia recognized h e r  predominant 
posi.tion and perhaps exaegerated it. I n  LIay 1945, Pa r t i san  
f o r c e s  marched i n t o  T r i e s t e  and the  Austrian 3rovinces of 
Carint51a and S t ~ r i a  n2 only a f t e r  a t h s e a t  of Allies force  
656 t3eg wl thdraw , Ti t o  obviouslg expected 3ussian support * 
D * 
in this maneuver, but because S t a l i n  apparent ly d i d  not  wish . 6 
3 t o  chance open conflict with the Vest, i t  was not  forthconing. '1 
Titots r eac t ion  was explosive.  I n  a speech a t  I 
Ljubl jana ,  a t  the end of r'ay 1945, he announced: I 
It i s  s a i d  t h a t  t h i s  i s  a jus t  war, and w e  have con- 
sfdsred i t  such, Eowever, we a l s o  seek a just  end. ??e 
demand t h a t  eveqone  s h a l l  be master i n  h i s  own house. 
'f~ans Kohn, Pan-Slavism : I t s  Els tory  and Ideolopy 
(Kotre Dame, Indiana: i 'n iversl ty  of :;otre 2wne :ress, 1;53), 
\Ve do no t  want t o  pay o t h e r  peop le ' s  b i l l s .  r e  do no t  
want t o  be used a s  a b r i b e  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  barga in ing .  
We do n o t  want t o  g e t  involved i n  a p o l i c y  of sphe re s  
of i n f l u e n c e  .l 
Although T i t o  c la ims t o  have been d i r e c t i n g  his r e -  
marks on ly  toward t h e  Western Powers, i t  looked t o  S t a l i n  as 
if T i t o  were p u b l i c l y  warning him.2 On June 5, t h e  S o v i e t  
Ambassador d e l i v e r e d  t h e  f o l l  owing ultimatum t o  t h e  Yugoslav 
Fore ign  Off ice ;  " T e l l  Comrade T i t o  that  i f  he should  once 
a e a i n  permi t  such a n  a t t a c k  on t h e  Sovie t  Union we s h a l l  be 
f o r c e d  t o  r e p l y  w i t h  open c r i t i c i s m  i n  t h e  p r e s s  and disavow 
him. 3 
The t e r r i t o r i a l  c la ims advanced a g a i n s t  Aus t r i a  and 
I t a l y  would have been made by any Yugoslav government. But 
t h e  I1violent  and provocat ive  manner" which t he  Yugoslav 
Communists adopted c l e a r l y  i n d i c a t e s  t h e i r  s e l f - r e c o g n i t i o n  
4 
as t h e  "advance p a r d  of Sommunisrn. I t  & l s o  brought t h e i r  
f i rs t  t h r e a t  of e x c m u n i c a t i o n .  5 
The Comunls t s continued t o  r u l e  pos t-war Yugoslavia 
by means of t h e l r  monol i th ic  p o l i t i c a l  organ, t h e  People ' s  
Fron t .  The Communist P a r t y  i t s e l f  remained an  e l i t e  organi-  
z a t i o n  cmposed of P a r t i s a n  veberans of proved l o y a l t y  and 
d i s c i p l i n e .  Hes i t an t  t o  r i s k  lowering i t s  s tandards ,  i t  
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accepted  new members slowly, l e t t i n g  the  Popular F r o n t  handle  
mass rec ru i t i ng . '  Always i n  t h e  background-- though no t  always 
inconspicuously  so-- t he  C.P.Y. w a s  content  t o  simply p u l l  
t h e  s t r i n g  of i t s  p o l i t i c a l  puppet. 
Like a l l  good Communists, T i t o  was a planner .  Since,  
as an orthodox Marxis t ,  he was f i r m l y  convinced t h a t  indus t -  
r i a l i z a t i o n  was a fundamental r e q u i s i t e  of soc ia l i sm,  he 
planned f o r  a vigorous program of i n d u s t r i a l  expansion. Not 
on ly  would i t  be necessary t o  l a y  t h e  foundat ion f o r  heavy i n -  
d u s t r y ,  b u t  t h e  product ion of long absent  and much needed con- 
sumer goods and a r t i c l e s  of d a i l y  consumption would have t o  
be expanded. I n  the  sp r ing  of 1946 a Law of t h e  S t a t e  Economic 
P lan  was promulgated and' the  o rgan iza t iona l  b a s i s  was l a i d  
f o r  long-term economic ~ l a n n i n g .  
I n  Apr i l  1947, Yucoslavia launched t h e  f i r s t  Five Year I 
Plan,  t he  f i r s t  s a t e l l i t e  t o  undertake l o n p t e r m  econonic 1 I 
planning.2 I n  terms of i n i t i a l  capac i ty  and u l t ima te  aims 
the  p l an  was excep t iona l ly  ~ n r e a l i s t i c . ~  T i t o  and h i s  econ- 
I Seton-Watson, The East  European Revolution, p. 312. t 
I 
' ~zechos lovak ia  and Bulearia began Five Year Plans  i n  
1949 and l!uncaq, i n  1950. Also i n  1950 Poland becan a Six 
Year Plan.  
3 It would be impossible t o  eva lua te  t h e  success  or 
f a i l u r e  of t he  Yueoslav Five Year Plan: f i r s t ,  because the  
economic boycot t  imposed on Yycoslavia by the  Corninform 
c o u n t r i e s  i n  1948 n e c e s s i t a t e d  a complete r e v i s i o n  of t he  
p l a n ;  and, second, because any informat ion d e a l i n s  wi th  the  
Yuroslav economy (product lon  capac i ty ,  and expor t  and import 
f  i r u r e s )  i s  a c l o s e l y  p~a r r i ed  s e c r e t .  For a t5orouyh discus-  
s i o n  of the Y u ~ o s l a v  Five S e a r  Plan, see  Josef Korbel, T i to1  s 
Communism (Denver : Univers i ty  of Denver Press, 1951 ), po. 287-231, 
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omic a d v i s o r s  a p p a r e n t l y  did. no t  worry about Y u g o s l a v i a f s  
l a c k  of eng inee r s ,  t e c h n i c i a n s ,  mechanics, s k i l l e d  craf tsmen,  
and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  and manager ia l  o f f i c i a l s  . I n  f i v e  y e a r s  
Yugoslavia  was t o  be t ransformed from a backward, a g r i c u l t u r a l  
coun t ry  t o  a modern, i n d u s t r i a l  s t a t e .  
S t a l i n ,  however, d id  n o t  approve of t h i s  ambi t ious  
p l an .  I n  t h e  o v e r - a l l  Sovie t  scheme, Yugoslavia was t o  be 
t h e  "breadbasketl1 of e a s t e r n  Europe, a s u p p l i e r  of a g r i c u l t u r a l  
and i n d u s t r i a l  raw m a t e r i a l s ,  whi le  Czechoslovakia and Poland 
would be t h e  producer of f i n i s h e d  goods.1 T i t o  was l a t e r  t o  
c la im t h a t  l~oscow hampered t h e  f u l f i l l m e n t  of t h e  F ive  Year 
P l an  by decep t ion  and de lay  i n  f i n a n c i a l  and t r a d e  m a t t e r s .  2 
Having b u i l t  S o c i a l Z q  t h e  s a t e l l i t e s  would be more 
t h a n  e v e r  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  l a w s  of S o c i a l i s t  planning,  
and e v e r y t h i n g  po in ted  towards t he sebe ing  i n t e r p r e t e d  
towards one s i n g l e  end, t h e  s t r e n ~ t h e n i n g  of 3us s i a  and 
t h e  p e r p e t u a t i o n  of h e r  predominance. The economy of 
each  would proeuce f o r  Russia f i r s t ,  and f o r  i t s e l f - -  
t o  t h e  degree  that i t  was admi t ted  t o  have requirements  
of i t s  own-- ~ e c o n d . ~  
The Sov ie t  a t t i t u d e  towar6 t h e  Five  Year Plan was 
bound t o  have profound p o l i t i c a l  r ami f i ca t i ons .  T f to  had 
p rog i sed  t h e  Yugoslav people h y d r o - e l e c t r i c i t y ,  i r r i g a t i o n ,  
f a c t o r i e s ,  and hip.hways, a s  wel l  a s  consumer goods. But, i f  
Russia  would n o t  supply t h e  necessary  heavy equipment and 
f i n a n c i a l  a s s i s t a n c e ,  t he se  p lans  would have t o  be postponed, 
l ~ n a t o l e  G .  blazour, Russia Pas t  and Presen t  (New York: 
D. Van Nostrand Co., 1951) ,  p .  713. 
' ~ n n s t r o n ~ ,  9. e., p. 48.  
3 ~ b i d . ,  p.  50. 
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i f  n o t  abandoned.' It would be d i f f i c u l t  t o  e x p l a i n  what 
had gone wrong. 
Moreover, from Moscovr came o rde r s  tha t  t h e  urban 
working c l a s s  minor i t y  should hold  t h e  1 e a d i n g . r o l e  i n  b o t h  
P a r t y  and government and t h a t  t h e  peasant  m a j o r i t y  should ' .be 
r e s t r i c t e d  t o  a secondary in f luence .  The same p r i n c i p l e ,  i f  
a p p l i e d  on the  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l e v e l ,  would mean a l o s s  of 
s t a t u s  and p r e s t i g e  f o r  a g r a r i a n  n a t i o n s .  T i t o ,  as a repre-  
s e n t a t i v e  of peasan t  Yugoslavia, t h e r e f o r e ,  would be much 
l e s s  i n f l u e n t i a l  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  Communist c i r c l e s  than  t h e  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of the  more urban and i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  c o i m t r i e s  . 2 
Even f o r  such a devoted d i sc i -p le  as T i t 6 ,  t h i s  must have been 
d i f f i c u l t  t o  accep t .  
The new Yugoslav government a l s o  found t r o u b l e  i n  
c a r r y i n g  ou t  i t s  vigorous  program of c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n .  3 
The peasan t s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  Serb ia ,  r e b e l l e d  a t  the  i d e a  
of lo sin^ a n c e s t r a l  land.  Overt r e s i s t a n c e  w a s ,  of course,  
ou t  of t h e  ques t ion ,  bu t  d i s sa t i s - f ac t ion  w a s  widespread. 
t 'ost  of T i t o t s  P a r t i s a n  f i ~ h t e r s  had been peasan t s  and th i s  
proEram w a s  a l i e n a t i n p  sone of his  o l d e s t  and s taunches t  
s u p p o r t e r s  ., 
3 ~ ~ a m ,  9. G., p. 120: n .  . . There i s  ample  round 
t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t he  r u l e r s  of Yucoslavia, out  of t h e i r  Comu- 
n i s t  f ana t i c ixm and economic na ive t e ,  before  1948 pursued a  
f a s t e r  pace i n  t he  c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n  of a g r i c u l t u r e  than any 
o t h e r  country  i n  t h e  s a t e l l i t e  a r e a  exce?t ,  perhaps, Fu lcar ia ,  
where t he  save c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  mot ivated i t s  Communist govern- 
ment. " 
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I n  t h e  s p r i n g  of 1946 T i t o  had r e t u r n e d  from one o f  
h is  f r e q u e n t  t r i p s  t o  Koscow w i t h .  t h e  announcement tha t  t h e  
S o v i e t  Union w a s  going t o  rearm t h e  Yugoslav army w i t h  modern 
equipment, r eorgan ize  I t s  s t r u c t u r e ,  and supply  i t  w i t h  m i l i -  
tary and 
- -  - 
t e c h n i c a l  a d v i s o r s ,  
This o f f e r  on t h e  p a r t  of t h e  Sov ie t  Union, a l t h o w  
advantageous t o  the  Yugoslavs, developed some r a t h e r  d i s t u r b -  




- - - 
by dec id ing  how the  new army w a s  t o  be equipped, 
n t r o l  i t s  f u t u r e  cha rac t e r .  Ti to ;  however, was d e t e r -  
mined t h a t  t h e  army should no t  l o s e  i t s  i d e n t i t y ,  and simply I 
become a  wes te rn  am of t h e  Sov ie t  m i l i t a r y .  Moreover, . h e  d i d  
n o t  want S o v i e t  I n t e l l i g e n c e  t o  opera te  i n  t h e  Yugoslav Army. . 
J 
And v h a t  w a s  he t o  t h i n k  when the  Sovie t  " e x ~ e r t s ~  s u r a e s t e d  I I 
s t a n d i n e  army, and adv ised  a g a i n s t  Yugoslavia b u i l d i n g  
- 
up a n a t i o n a l  amaments  industry? '  1 
The most immediate a h  of post-war Yugos l av i a t s  f o r e i g n  I 
I 
2 
p o l i c y  was t h e  founda t ion  of a  Ealkan f e d e r a t i o n .  This  f ede r -  I t 
I 
a t i o n  was t o  be e f f e c t e d  by the  union of Eulgar ia  and Yugo- 1 I 
I 
I 
s l a v l a - -  and,  perhaps,  a t  some f u t u r e  d a t e  Albania.  Eu lgar ia  I 
and  YUEO s l a v i a  bo th  emerged from t h e  w a r  as Comunist s t a t e s .  
A union of t h e s e  two n a t i o n s  would have s e v e r a l  s a l u t a r y  
e f f e c t s :  (1) economically,  it d e f i n i t e l y  would be t o  t h e i r  
mutual  advantape;  ( 2 )  i t  would, i n  one way o r  ano the r ,  d i s -  
pose of t he  troublesome "1,Aacedonian problem," which had long  

The f i r s t  s t e p  toward t h e  proposed union seemed t o  
have t aken  p l ace  i n  August 1947. Prime h l in i s t e r  C-eorgi 
Dimitrov of Bulgar ia  confer red  wi th  f . ;arshall  T i t o  a t  Bled 
and i t  w a s  announced tha t  a t r e a t y  of f r i e n d s h i p  and a cus- 
toms union were be ing  considered.' Although p u b l i c l y  t h e  
f r u i t s  of simply a t r e a t y  of a l l i a n c e ,  i t  l lalmost  c e r t a i n l y  
con ta ined  unpublished c l auses  . l t2  The f o l l o r i n g  Aovember, 
when T i t o  v i s i t e d  So f i a  t o  s i g n  t h e  t r e a t y ,  he s a i d  tha t  
Bulgar ia  and Yu,?oslavia were being bound so c lo se  t oge the r ,  
" f e d e r a t i o n  w i l l  be a mere Marshall  T i t o  was 
g u i l t y  of undue optimism. 
The Cominfom 
Bg 1943, when t h e  headquar te rs  of t h e  Third  I n t e r -  
n a t i o n a l  announced i t s  d i s s o l u t i o n  i n  a g e s t u r e  6f c o w t e s y  
toward Russia1 s wartime a l l i e s ,  i t  had a l r e a d y  become obvious 
t h a t  post-war Comunism would r e q u i r e  a new and c3f f e r e n t  
type of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r ~ a n i z a t i o n .  The end of the  w a r  would 
wi tnes s ,  i n  a l l  p r o b a b i l i t y ,  t he  emergence of new Comunis t  
s t a t e s  and s t r o w  Communist p a r t i e s .  The Somintern, w i t h  i t s  
rloscow headaua r t e r s  and obvious obedience t o  t h e  Soviet  Union, 
had been one of t h e  main reasons f o r  t he  d i s t r u s t  of Comunism 
f e l t  by even t h e  most r a d i c a l  S o c i a l i s t s  i n  the Thus, 
such an  organizat ion, '  "owned and opera ted  by l i o s ~ o w , ~ ~  would 
prove a tremendous l i a b i l i t y  t o  t he  development of post-war 
Communism. 
The "newt1 o rgan iza t ion  came i n t o  be ing  i n  September I 
1947, when t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of t h e  C m ' u n i s t  p a r t i e s  of I 
t h e  U .S .S .R.,  Yugoslavia, Poland, Hungary, Bulgar ia ,  Rumania, I 
Czechoslovakia, France,  and I t a l y  met i n  Warsaw, Poland, and I 
organized  the  Communist I n f o m a t i o n  Bureau, t h e  r lCmin fom."  
I t s  headquar te rs ,  i r o n i c a l l y  enough, were t o  be l o c a t e d  i n  
Belgrade.  A s  i t s  name i n d i c a t e s ,  t h e  Cominform was founded, 
o s t e n s i b l y  a t  l e a s t ,  f o r  t h e  exchange of information,  and 
no t  a s  a p o l i c y  making body. I n  r e a l i t y  t h e  c r e a t i o n  of the  
Cominform was one of a  s e r i e s  of s t e p s  taken t o  conso l ida te  
t h e  p o s i t i o n  of t h e  Sovie t  Union i n  e a s t e r n  Europe. 
The f a t e  of Europe had been sea l ed  i n  1944-1945 when 
t h e  two p e a t  A l l i e d  armies ,  t h e  e a s t e r n  and the -wes t e rn ,  met, 
and e f f e c t i v e l y  d iv ided  t h e  cont inen t  through t h e  cen te r .  
Althouph t h e  Yest considered t h i s  d i v i s i o n  t o  be teqporary 
and based on m i l i t a r y  expedience, t h e  Russians regarded it 
as pomanent ,  and immediately proceeded t o  i nco rpo ra t e  e a s t e r n  
Europe i n t o  the  Sov ie t  o r b i t .  1 
From 1945 t o  1947 the  Russians d id  not  seek  t o  f o r c e  
t h e  pace. S t a l i n  f e l t  t h a t  e a s t e r n  Europe w a s  his. He a l s o  
took i t  f o r  pranted t h a t  h i s  r u l e  over t h a t  p a r t  of the con- 
t i n e n t  would meet with Anerican, i f  not  R r i t i s h ,  acquiescence,  
and he d id  n o t  wish t o  arouse western ani?nosit ieS by t h e  to0  
l ~ ~ h ~  A.  Lukacs, The Great  Powers and Eas te rn  S ~ o p e  
(New York: American Rook Co., 19531, P P -  655-G%* 
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r a p i d  impos i t i on  of r a d i c a l  measures.' Edward Crankshaw s a y s ,  
"It cannot ,  indeed,  be emphasized t o o  much t h t  Sov ie t  a c t i o n s  
i n  E a s t e r n  Europe which looked t o  us l i k e  c a l c u l a t e d  a g g r e s s i o n  I 
a t  t h e  time seemed t h e  most n a t u r a l  and unremarkable behavior  
t r2 i n  t h e  world t o  t h e  Russians themselves.  . . . 
Never theless ,  by 1947 the  United S t a t e s  had become 
alarmed.  Not only  had Russia succeeded i n  s a t e l l i t i z i n g  
n e a r l y  a l l  of e a s t e r n  Europe, bu t  economic cond i t i ons  i n  
wes t e rn  Europe were such t h a t  they  i n v i t e d  t h e  spread  of 
Communism t o  that  a r ea .  The f i r m  s tand  taken  by t h e  Uni ted 
S t a t e s  a t  t h e  k7oscow Conference, 1.Tarch 10 t o  A p r i l  24, 1947, 
and t h e  Truman Doctr ine ,  proclaimed i n  March 1947, showed dePi-  
n i t e l y  that America w a s  determined t o  s t o p  any f u t u r e  Communist 
expansion i n  Europe. The Truman Doctrine p a r t i c u l a r l y ,  though 
conf ined  t o  Greece and Turkey, must have had ominous under- 
t ones  i n  ~.'oscow. The o f f e r  of ll iarshall Aid t h e  fo l lowing  
June p u t  the Sov ie t  Union on the  defens ive .  Even Poland and 
Czechoslovakia were e a e e r  t o  accep t  t he  o f f e r ,  be fore  t hey  
were remonstra ted by Moscow and abandoned the  i dea .  
Russia found a mixed r e a c t i o n  among t h e  var ious  
Communist p a r t i e s .  This is a g l a r i n g  example of t h e  na t ion-  
alism and independence t h a t  had c r e p t  i n t o  European Sommunism 
s i n c e  t h e  war. The Communists were no t  coord ina ted ;  they 
must c l o s e  ranks .  Thus, the  Corninform was born. 
2 ~ d w a r d  Crankshaw, Cracks i n  t h e  Kremlin Wall (New York: 
The Vikinz Press ,  1951) ,  p. 131. 
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Why were only nine  p a r t i e s  i n v i t e d  t o  t ake  p a r t  i n  
t he  founding ceremonies? It i s  impossible t o  j u s t i f y  t h e  
b a s i s  of s e l e c t i o n  on any systemat ic  grounds. Rumania w a s  I 
r ep re sen ted ,  bu t  no t  Albania; France was represen ted ,  b u t  I 
n o t  Germany. Conspicuously absen t  were t h e  European p a r t i e s  
which were numerical ly  weak and a l l  non-European p a r t i e s .  It 
i s  d F f f i c u l t  t o  be l i eve ,  however, t h a t  an  o rgan iza t ion  which 
c o n t r o l l e d  the  Communist p a r t i e s  of Poland and Czechoslovakia 
would n o t  c o n t r o l  those  of Germany and Aus t r ia ,  o r  that  the 
Cominform had j u r i s d i c t i o n  over France and I t a l y  b u t  n o t  
Belgium and spain.' Perhaps it was not  necessary t o  b r i n g  
t h e  s m a l l e r  p a r t i e s  i n t o  the  orpaniza t ion .  As Adam U l a m  
s t a t e s ,  "A  Communist Pa r ty  out  of power i s  l i k e l y  t o  be much 
more d o c i l e  toward th-Soviet Union than a r e  those  whose 
l e a d e r s  a r e  n o t o n l y  Communists but  a l s o  l e a d e r s  of t h e i r  
s t a t e  and n a t i o n .  w 2  Thus it can be s a f e l y  assumed t h e  juris- 
, d i c t i o n  of t h e  Cominform extended a l l  over Europe, and perhaps 
. 
t o  B r i t a i n  and America. 3 
S t i l l  e scap ing  C m i n f o m  con t ro l ,  however, were t h e  
Communist p a r t i e s  of Asia .  Perhaps th i s  can be explained by 
b r i e f l y  exarninine a f a c t i o n a l  s t r u g g l e  i n  t h e  Sovie t  P o l i t -  
buro.  In 1947 t h e r e  was an  obvious s p l i t  i n  t h e  Po l i t bu ro ,  
t he  n a t u r e  of which i s  not  e n t i r e l y  c l e a r .  Andrei Zhdanov, 
l ~ o r k e n a u ,  OJ. *., p. 521. 
2 ~ l a m ,  2. G., p .  49-  
' ~o rkenau ,  9. G., pp. 521-5220 
I 
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a p p a r e n t l y  the  l e a d e r  of t h e  f a c t i o n  opposino S t a l i n ,  and 
commonly regarded a s  t h e  most i n f l u e n t i a l  P o l i t b u r o  member 
a f t e r  S t a l i n  h imse l f ,  w a s  " e l e c t e d v  Secretary-General  o f  t h e  
Cominf o m .  A u t h o r i t i e s  a r e  i n  disagreement concerning t h e  
s i g n i f i c a n c e  of t h i s  move. Kamilton F i s h  Armstrong states 
that ~ t a l i n  probably  had Zhdanov t r a n s f e r r e d  t o  a f i e l d  of 
a c t i v i t y  where "he would have more l i m i t e d  c o n t a c t s  w i t h i n  
1 t h e  t o p  Communist l eadersh ip . "  Franz Borkenau, on t h e  o t h e r  
hand, b e l i e v e s  t h a t  Zhdanovls Corninform p o s i t i o n  i n d i c a t e d  a 
P o l i t b u r o  v i c t o r y  f o r  t h e  Zhdanovites and a  pe r sona l  s e tback  
f o r  ~ t a l i n . '  Whatever t h e  reason,  Zhdanov s t i l l  r e t a i n e d  a 
g r e a t  d e a l  of a u t h o r i t y  and i t  i s  l o g i c a l  t o  assume t h a t  
S t a l i n ,  s u f f e r i n g  a s e r i o u s  chal lenge f o r  h i s  power, had 
I 
I l i m i t e d  h is  opoonen t t s  persona l  i n f luence  t o  a r eg iona l  or-  I 
c a n i z a t i o n .  And as was ?robably a l r e a d y  apparen t ,  i t  was 
I 
t hose  Communist p a r t i e s  no t  i n  t h e  ?doninform, t h e  p a r t i e s  of i 
I Asia ,  which were t o  achieve no tab le  success  i n  t he  f u t u r e .  I 
I 
 he choice  of Belgrade as t h e  f i r s t  s e a t  of t h e  
I 
I Corninform b s  provided t h e  b a s i s  f o r  much s p e c u l a t i o n *  
I 
Vladimir Ded i j e r  claims t h a t  S t a l i n  h i m e l f  made the  choice I 
and i n d i c n a n t l y  e x a l a i n s  t h a t  i t  Was p a r t  of a  p l an  t o  bind 
Y u r o s l a ~ ~ i a  Ifas t i e h t l y  a s  pos s ib l e  t o  t h i s  o rgan iza t i on  i n  
o r d e r  t o  f a c i l i t a t e  t h e  blow t h a t  was t o  Amstrong 
l ~ r m s t r o n c ,  2. em, P- 57- 
2 Rorkenau, E. G., PP- 518 f f  
3 ~ e d i j e r ,  9. G., P- 295- 
/ 
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reasons a l o n g  similar l i n e s  : 
Perhaps Tdoscow may simply have r e a l i z e d ,  a f t e r  
p l a n s  f o r  the  Corninform had a l r e a d y  been made, t h a t  i f  
Belgrade became the  headquar ters  t he  i n t e r n a t i  ona l  
Communist luminar ies  assembled t h e r e  might h e l p  quiet 
t h e  membership of the Ju .os lav Par ty  v ~ h l  f lie the  T i t o  c l i q u e  was being p u r ~ e d . ~  
Franz Sorkenau s t a t e s  t h a t  i t  was an " a c t  of r e -  
b e l l i o n "  undertaken by the  Zhdanov f a c t i o n  a g a i n s t  S t a l i n .  2 
None of t hese  explana t ions  seem t o  s u f f i c e ,  P i r s t  of 
a l l ,  t h e  choice  of a s a t e l l i t e  country as t h e  s e a t  of t he  
Informat ion  Eureau was only n a t u r a l ,  i n  o rder  t o  avoid a 
T.:oscow l a b e l  and t o  give t h e  organiza t ion  an  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
f l a v o r .  Secondly, Yugoslavia i n  1947, f o r  a l l  h e r  d i f f e r e n c e s  
wi th  t h e  Sov ie t  Union, was s t i l l  Russ ia ' s  leading understudy. 
\'/hat o t h e r  country  was more deserving of t he  honor? That 
lCoscow may have had u l t e r i o r  motives i s  not a l t o g e t h e r  in -  
probable .  Yuposlavia had a l ready  shown ind ica t ions  of inde- 
pendent t h ink ing .  I.:oscow nay have f e l t  t h a t  t he  Cominf o m  
o f f i c e  i n  Belgrade would p o v i d e  a r e s t r a i n i n g  inf luence  on 
t h e  b o i s t e r o u s  ETu~oslavs and would e s t a b l i s h  them more f i m l y  
I n  t h e  Sov ie t  o r b i t .  To assume t h a t  the  R:lssians were a l r eady  
p lanning  T i t o ' s  excommunication would be accusing them of 
f o r e s i p h t  and p lannine  which would b e l i e  t h e i r  l a t e r  ac t ions .  
Zhdanov, c l e a r l y  the  dominating pe r sona l i t y  a t  t h e  
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1 September meeting,  i l l u s t r a t e d  t h e  g l a r i n g  ambivalence 
of t h e  new o rgan iza t i on  i n  a speech t o  t h e  assembled de l e -  
g a t e s  : "The' Sovie t  Union," he dec la red ,  flunswervingly h o l d s  
t h e  p o s i t i o n  t h a t  p o l i t i c a l  and economic r e l a t i o n s  between 
s t a t e s  b u s t  be b u i l t  e x c l u s i v e l y  on t h e  b a s i s  o f  e q u a l i t y  of 
t h e  P a r t i e s  and mutual r e s p e c t  f o r  t h e i r  s o v e r e i p  r i g h t s .  11 2 
But t h e n  he cont inued wi th  a conple te  a u t h o r i t a t i v e  d i r e c t i v e  
about  Corninform o r i e n t a t i o n  and w h a t  i t s  p o l i c i e s  would have 
t o  be. 3 
The one d i s co rdan t  no t e  of t he  conference w a s  t h e  
speech  of Edvard Kardel j, Yugoslaviat s Fore ign  Min i s t e r .  In 
c o n t r a s t  t o  o t h e r  speakers ,  Ka rde l j  was no t  f u l l  of p r a i s e  
f o r  t h e  S o v i e t  Union, and t a k i n g  c e r t a i n  l i c e n s e  w i t h  f a c t ,  
he  b i t t e r l y  a t t a c k e d  " those  who s landered  our  P a r t y  . . . t o  
t h e  e f f e c t  t h a t  t h e  n a t i o n a l  l i b e r a t i o n  u p r i s i r q  developed 
f u l l y  on ly  a f t e r  H i t l e r t  s a t t a c k  on t h e  Sov ie t  Cnion and n o t  
b e f o r e .  w 4  Koreover, he d id  not  once mention t h a t  Yugoslavia 
owed i t s  l i b e r a t i o n  t o  t h e  Sov ie t  Union and t h e  Red Amy, an  
5 
i n ~ r a t i a t i n ~  t r i b u t e  con t inua l ly  repea ted  by o t h e r  coun t r i e s .  
~ A C  companying Zhdanov t o  t h e  conference,  bu t  occupying 
a secondary p o s i t i o n ,  was Seorg i  Yalenkov. One y e a r  l a t e r ,  w i t h  
Zhdanovts dea th ,  IIalenkov was t o  r i s e  n e a r  t h e  t o p  of t h e  Sov ie t  
h i e r a r c h y .  Less than s i x  yea r s  l a t e r ,  follow in,^: t h e  dea th  of  
S t a l i n ,  he was t o  become the  l e a d e r  of the  Sovie t  Union. 
2 ~ o r  a Las t i ng  Peace, For a Peop le t s  3emocracg ( O f f i c i a l  
Caminform p u b l i c a t i o n ) ,  ;'.ovember 10, 1947, quoted i n  :lam, 2. 
e., p. 50.  
'FOP a  Lasting; Peace, lovember 10,  1947, quoted i n  -* IbiC 9 
p. 53. 
'set, U l a m ,  9. a., pp. 52-53. 
Nor d i d  Milovan D j i l a s  i n  h i s  co-repor t  f o r  Yugoslavia choose 
t o  be ove r ly  e n t h u s i a s t i c  about  Russ ia l s  r o l e  i n  t h e  Balkan 
l i b e r a t i o n .  1 
Did t h i s  behavior on t h e  p a r t  of t h e  Yugoslav de le -  
g a t i o n  f o r e t e l l  t h e  coming schism? Appearances t o  t h e  con- 
trary, t h e  answer i s  no. Mr. Adam Ulam i n  d i s c u s s i n g  t h e  I 
s i g n i f i c a n c e  of Kardel j t  s a t t i t u d e  probably sums up the  en- 
t i r e  atmosphere of t he  conference.  
With our accumulated h inds igh t  i t  i s  e a s y  t o  see i n  
Kardel  j ' s  depar ture  from the  e t i q u e t t e  r equ i r ed  a t  a 
Communist meeting a sure  p o r t e n t  of t he  c r i s e s  which one 
y e a r  l a t e r  was t o  rock the  Cominform and cause t h e  g r e a t  
b reak  between X'ioscow. and Belgrade. Yet such an explan- 
a t i o n  would be f a r - f e t ched .  The Yugoslav1 s were probably 
indu lg ing  i n  a t y p i c a l  e x h i b i t i o n  of t h e i r  bad temper, 
occasioned by Eoscowls a t tempt  t o  s e t  them a t  t h e  same 
l e v e l  a s ,  say  t h e  Hungarian o r  Bulgarian Communists, 
who had rece ived  t h e i r  freedom from t h e  Red Amy i n s t e a d  
of working f o r  i t  themselves. They were no t  as  y e t  r e -  
b e l l i n q ;  they were su lk ing .  The meeting, which t o  a . 
c a s u a l  observer  would have appeareci a s  a conference be- 
tween equa ls  s i t h  the  Sovie t  Union p l ag i cg  the  r o l e  of 
rimus i n t e r  p a r e s r  must have been recognized by the  in -  *... b ~ a  cd as  the s e t t i n c  f o r  a new s t age  i n  t h e  d e v e l o p ~ e n t  
of t h e  Communist-dominated ~ o v e r m e n t s  of Eas t e rn  Surope-- 
a s t a g e  which would be cha rac t e r i zed  more and more by 
s t r e s s  on un i formi ty  and subord ina t ion  and l e s s  and l e s s  
on t h e  r i g h t  of each  eovernment t o  fol low i t s  own rou te  
t o  socialLsm w i t h  only  e e n e r a l  p i d a n c e  by Sovie t  po l i cy  
and d i r e c t i v e s .  The Yu&oslav l e a d e r s  had cane t o  t he  
conference wi th  a profound i r r i t a t i o n  over c e r t a i n  a s p e c t s  
of Sov ie t  p o l i c i e s .  Eut t h e i r  i r r i t a t i o n  was as y e t  not  
e q u i v a l e n t  t o  def iance .  It i s  n e c e s s a v  t o  draw t'nis 
r a t h e r  s u b t l e  d i s t i n c t i o n  if the  whole course o f  the  h s s o -  
Yuroslav d i spu te  i s  t o  be understood.2 
The Crisis 
If t h e  Cominform had been c r e a t e d  wi th  a view toward 
I 
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cu rb ing  exces s ive  independence and c r e a t i n g  a European Commu- 
nism t o t a l l y  s u b s e r v i e n t  t o  t h e  Sov ie t  Union, i t s  immediate 
e f f e c t s  were f a r  from s u c c e s s f u l .  Yugoslavia, long  t h e  symbol 
I 
of independence among the  "independent" People ' s  Democracies I 
of E a s t e r n  Europe, now cont inued a s  t h e  symbol of independence 
among t h e  Cominf o m  s People 1 s Democracy. I n s t e a d  of l o s i e  
prominence by subo rd ina t ion  t o  t h e  Corninform, t h e  Land of t h e  
South S l a v s  took on a new, though no t  a n  env iab le ,  p r e s t i g e  
as t h e  major  spokesman a g a i n s t  extending Sov ie t  power and 
Russian na t i ona l i sm .  
It i s  t r u e  that  Y u g o s l a v i a ~ s  new p o s i t i o n  o r ,  perhaps ,  
o l d  p o s i t i o n  i n  new ci rcumstances ,  was occasioned as much by 
w i s h f u l  t h i n k i n g  on t h e  p a r t  of o t h e r  Communist l e a d e r s  as I 
by any  o v e r t  a c t s  on h e r  own p a r t .  T i t o ,  pe r sona l ly ,  w a s  no I 
b e t t e r  o r  no worse t han  be fo re  ; bu t  T i t o ,  ~ s y c h o l o g i c a l l y ,  I 
had become t h e  p e r s o n i f i c a t i o n  of a l l  t h a t  Yoscow was d e t e r -  I 
mined t o  d e s t r o y ,  H i s  only  a p ~ a r e n t  depa r tu re  from I r ~ e a l i n  I 
p r e s c r i b e d  e t i q u e t t e  was a n  a ~ g r e s s i v e  speech on September 27, 
1947, i n  which he c r i t i c i z e d  t he  heads of o t h e r  Comunis t  
P a r t i e s  f o r  t i m i d i t y  of l e a e a r s h i p  and even a s s e r t e d  that  s o m  
were a l l o w i n r  " r e a c t i o n a r y  t reacherous  l eadersh ip"  t o  r ena in  
' I 
i n  power i n  t h e  Peop le ' s  F ron t s .  1 
t 
Rela t i ons  between the  two c o u n t r i e s  continued t o  be 
~ o o d ,  on t h e  su r f ace ,  b u t  f u t u r e  p o l i t i c a l  even t s  were t ak ing  
shape.  The f i r s t  development of s i r n i f i c a n c e  came w i t h  t h e  
new year. I n  e a r l y  Januarg Prime Min i s t e r  Din i t rov  of F u l r a r i a  
'see A r m s t r o n ~ ,  9. - c i t . ,  p. 5 0 .  
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made a n  o f f i c i a l  v i s i t  t o  Rumania. I n  a n  i n t e r v i e w  on t h i s  
occas ion  he was asked f o r  a s t a t emen t  on t h e  proposed Balkan 
and Eas t  European f e d e r a t i o n s  and whether o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  
from t h e s e  r eg ions  would be a b l e  t o  j o in .  1 
For a former Secretary-General  of t h e  Cornintern, 
Dimitrov was n o t  too  cons ide ra t e  of t h e  Sov ie t  Union.2 He 
r e p l i e d  i n  p a r t  : 
The q u e s t i o n  of a f e d e r a t i o n  o r  con fede ra t i on  i s  
premature f o r  us .  It i s  no t  on t h e  agenda a t  p re sen t ,  
and t h e r e f o r e  t h i s  ques t i on  w a s  no t  a  s u b j e c t  of t h e  d i s -  
cus s ion  a t  our  conferences .  Yi'hen t h e  ques t i on  matures ,  
and it must i n e v i t a b l y  mature,  then  our peoples ,  t h e  
n a t i o n s  of people s democracy, Rumania, Bulgar ia ,  Yugo- 
s l a v i a ,  Albania ,  Czechoslovakia, Poland, Xungary and  
Greece-- mind you, and Greece!-- w i l l  s e t t l e  i t .  It 
i s  they  who w i l l  dec ide  what i t  w i l l  be-- a f e d e r a t i o n  
o r  con fede ra t i on ,  and when and how it  w i l l  be formed.3 
On January 29, 1948, Pravda, undoubtedly exp re s s ing  
t h e  a t t i t u d e  of t he  Ysemlin, wrote i n  r e p l y  t o  r e a l  o r  h a g -  I 
i n e d  I n q u i r i e s  about  t h e  p a p e r ' s  p u b l i c a t i o n  of D imi t rov f s  
s t a t emen t  : 
. . . [The p u b l i c a t i o n  of t h e  statement] does no t  mean 
that t h e  e d i t o r s  of Pravda a e r e e  w i t h  Comrade Dimitrov 
on t h e  q u e s t i o n  of f e c e r a t i o n  and customs union among 
t h e  c o u n t r i e s  mentioned. On t h e  con t ra ry ,  t he  e d i t o r s  of 
Pravda c  onsi  d e r  that  t he se  c o u n t r i e s  r e q u i r e  no quest ion-  
' ~ d i  j e r ,  =. -* c i t  3 p. 313. 
'ularn, 9. G., p. 94 n:  "The speeches of Dimitrov 
l e a d  t o  t he  t heo ry  . . . that  t he  ve te ran  Communist l e a d e r  had 
a t t emp ted  t o  form a  f e d e r a t i o n  of Eas te rn  Communist s t a t e s  i n  
o r d e r  t o  f r e e  them from the  i n f luence  of Yoscow. Khatever t h e  
m e r i t  of such t h e o r i z i n g ,  i t  must be obvious that  3 imi t rov1  s 
speeches  could  no t  have been made, and pub l i c i zed  i n  t h e  
S o v i e t  p r e s s ,  u n l e s s  a t  t h e  time when they were given they  
expressed  t h e  viewpoint  of the U.S.S.3." 
3 ~ e d i j e r ,  2. G., pp.  313-314. 
a b l e  and f a b r i c a t e d  f e d e r a t i o n  o r  con fede ra t i on ,  o r  a 
customs union;  what t hey  r e q u i r e  i s  t h e  c o n s o l i d a t i o n  
and defense  of t h e i r  independence and s o v e r e i c n t y  by 
m o b i l i z i n g  and organil l ing i n t e r n a l l y  t h e i r  peop le ' s  
democrat ic  f o r c e s ,  as  w a s  c o r r e c t l y  s t a t e d  i n  t h e  wel l -  
known d e c l a r a t i o n  of the  n ine  Communist ~ a r t i e 3 . l  
This s h o r t  paragraph marked t h e  complete c o l l a p s e  of  
t h e  main o b j e c t i v e  of Yugoslavia '  s f o r e i g n  p o l i c y .  "Though 
i t  w a s  Dimitrov who had t o  r ecan t ,  t h e  blow s t r u c k  h a r d e s t  
a t  T i t o  and  h i s  
E a r l y  i n  1948 t h e  Sov ie t  P o l i t b u r o  consu l ted  c e r t a i n  
s e l e c t e d  members of o t h e r  Corninform P a r t i e s  about curb ing  
t h e  exces s ive  independence of t h e  C.P.Y. The need f o r  c z u t i o n  
had been dec ided ly  minimized by t h e  Communist coup d f e ' t a t  i n  
Czechoslovakia i n  l a t e  ~ e b r u a r y . ~  Any semblance of indepen- 
dence which Benes and Xasaryk had been a b l e  t o  ma in t a in  w a s  
fone.  It was improbable t h a t  any a c t i o n  a g a i n s t  T i t o  and 
h i s  croup,  r e q a r d l e s s  of how obvious t he  i n t e n t i o n ,  could 
have any s e r i o u s  p o l i t i c a l  consequence now t h a t  a l l  of the 
s a t e l l i t e  c o u n t r i e s  were f i r m l y  i n  t he  hands of t h e  C m u n i s t s .  
Accordinc t o  A r m s t r o n ~ ,  many of t he  t o p  Zomnunists 
a t  t h i s  meet in6 were d i s tu rbed  a t  t he  prospect  of ha r sh  
a c t i o n  a r a i n s t  T i t o .  One of t h e  more yworninent of t h e s e  w a s  
Georgi Dimitrov, Prime Y i n i s t e r  of P u l e a r i a ,  head of t h e  
P u l ~ a r i a n  Comun i s t  Pa r ty ,  and former Secretary-General  of 
t h e  o l d  Comintern. Cheorgiu S h e o r ~ i u - 3  j, Vice-premier of  
Rumania and Secretary-Cleneral of the  Rumanian ?!orkers Pa r ty  
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(~omrnunis t  1, was ano the r .  Even Thorez of France and T o ~ l i a t t i  
of I t a l y  favored only gradual  e f f o r t s  t o  b r i n c  T i t o  i n t o  l i n e .  
Wladyslaw Gomulka, t he  P o l i s h  Communist and one of t h e  found- 
i n g  f a t h e r s  of the Cominfomn, was opposed t o  any d i s c i p l i n a r y  
a c t i o n  a g a i n s t  T i t o  and t h e  C.P.Y.' IrHe knew that i f  the  
Kremlin had i t s  way t h i s  would be the end of a l l  independence, 
e i t h e r  P a r t y  or  governren ta l ,  i n  s a t e l l i t e  c a p i t a l s .  "2 
There i s  a l s o  evidence t o  i n d i c a t e  tha t  perhaps no 
l e s s e r  f i e u r e  t han  Zhdanov himself  may have opposed harsh  
a c t i o n  a e a i n s t  T i t o .  Aside from wishing t o  preserve and per- 
p e t u a t e  t h e  Cominform as he had made i t  and i n  which he exer-  
c i s e d  g r e a t  i n f l u e n c e ,  Zhdanov may have d i sagreed  wi th ~ t a l f n f  s 
b a s i c  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  aims I n  Gastern  Europe and des i r ed  t o  see  
a  Xarxis  t conanunity based on independent Comunis t  p a r t i e s  
and qovernments under Sovie t  p i d a n c e  and d i r e c t i o n ,  bu t  no t  
3 
a s  mere t o o l s  of the  Kremlin. I n  any event ,  a l l  op?os i t ion  
was over ru led .  
This ha l f -hea r t ed  support  f o r  T i t o  was completely 
impersonal .  The Yugoslav1 s b u l l p r s g ~ i n g  of  o t h e r  Xuropean 
C o m u n i s t s  who had spent  t he  war yea r s  i n  !:oscow, t h e i r  con- 
s t a n t  reminders that t h e  C.P.Y. had achieved power by i t s  
own e f f o r t s ,  and t h e i r  boas t s  about the  r ap id  p m p r e s s  of 
' ~ n n s t r o n ~ ,  2. -* c i t  9 p.  59. 2 ~ b i d .  - 
 his is  the  srrument put  f o r t h  by Armstrong (a. - c i t  ., 
pp.  57 f f .  ) and can be s u b s t a n t i a t e d  t o  some ex ten t .  Forkenau 
(OJ. G. , pp.  518 f f .  ) ayrees ,  but  h i s  t h e s i s  of Zhdanovls 
a c t u a l  r e b e l l i o n  q a i n s t  ;:oscow seems t o  l a c k  s u f f i c i e n t  f a c t s .  
Howevor, Dedi je r  (OJ. e., passim) r ep re sen t s  Zhdanov a s  one 
of the  a r c h  c r imina l s  i n  t he  Soviet  Conspiracy. 
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s o c i a l i s m  i n  t h e i r  c o u n t r y  could  h a r d l y  have endeared  T i t o  
and his  c o l l e a g u e s  t o  o t h e r  Sommunist l e a d e r s .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  
t h e r e  was a n  obvious community of i n t e r e s t .  If T i t o  cou ld  
be purged,  none of them were s a f e .  The i n s t i n c t  of s e l f -  
p r e s e r v a t i o n  was s t r o n g ;  t h e  method of s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n ,  
however, was n o t  r e a d i l y  d i s c e r n i b l e  . 
The mere f a c t  t h a t  some of t h e  Communist l e a d e r s  had 
q u e s t i o n e d  t h e  wisdom of hloscow~s judgment became an  u r g e n t  
r e a s o n  t o  e n f o r c e  i t  .l 
On Riarch 18, 1948, t h e  Yugoslav government was i n -  
formed that  t h e  S o v i e t  Union was immediately withdrawing a l l  
military a d v i s o r s  and i n s t r u c t o r s .  The fo l lowing  day I t  was 
announced t h a t  a l l  S o v i e t  c i v i l i a n  s p e c i a l i s t s  a n 6  t e s h n i -  
c i a n s  were a l s o  be inp  c a l l e d  hoqe. On Varch 20, T i t o  wrote  
t o  S o v i e t  ? o r e i m  Y i n i s t e r  :l'olotov i n q u i r i n g  about  t h e  r e c a l l ,  
t h u s  s e t t i n g  o f f  a s e r i e s  of acrimonious charees  by t h e  S o v i e t  
Union and determined d e n i a l s  by t h e  Y u ~ o s l a v h .  
2 
The r e s u l t i n q  correspondence t a k i n g  p l a c e  between t h e  
two c o u n t r i e s  i s  unique f o r  two reasons :  (1) from t h e i r  f i r s t  
c m u n i c a t i  on on ?,:arch 27, t h e  S o v i e t  a t t i t u d e  was one of 
s c o r n  a n d  open contempt,  whi le  t h e  Yugoslavs were h u ~ b l e  a n d  
sometimes a p o l o p e t i c - -  b u t  always f i m ;  and ( 2 )  one can  n o t  
h e l p  n o t i c i n g  t h e  obvious  propacanda element  i n  the S o v i e t  
n o t e s ,  a n  o d d i t y  i n  c o n f i d e n t i a l  d ip lomat ic  correspondence.  
2 ~ r a n s l a t e d  i n  The S o v i e t  Yuyoslav Dis2ute :  T e s t  of 
P u b l i s h e d  Correspondence (London : The ;-.oyal I n s  t l t u t e  of 
In ternnL. lona1 A f f n i r s ,  1948) .  
The tone of T i t o ' s  LZarch 20 l e t t e r  t o  ILolotov i n d i -  
c a t e s  that  he was c l e a r l y  aware of t h e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  of t h e  
S o v i e t  a c t i o n .  The reasons  given f o r  the  withdrawal of 
S o v i e t  pe rsonne l ,  t h e  Yugoslav's l a c k  of confidence i n  and 
u n f r i e n d l y  a t t i t u d e  toward the  Russian a d v i s o r s ,  were pa lpab l e  
i n v e n t i o n s .  Torn between i n c r e d u l i t y  and indignaucn, T i t o  
wro te :  a r e  amazed, we cannot understand,  and  we a r e  
deep ly  h u r t  by not  being infonned of t h e  t r u e  reason  f o r  t h i s  
d e c i s i o n  by the  ~ove rnmen t  of t he  U.S.S.R.wl 
If T i t o  had any doubt about  t h e  Kremlin1 s i n t e n t i o n s ,  
i t  must have been removed upon r e c e i p t  of t h e  Sov ie t  rep ly .  
I n  t h e  no te ,  da t ed  Karch 27, the  Sovie t s  c l e a r l y  presaged 
w h a t  was t o  came. Not con ten t  w i t h  more r e c e n t  d e v e l o p e n t s ,  
t h e  no t e  r e f e r r e d  t o  a  s ta tement  made by i.lilovan 3 j i l a s  i n  
1944 t o  t he  e f f e c t  t h a t  " sov i e t  o f f i c e r s  were, from a moral  
s t andpo in t ,  i n f e r i o r  t o  t he  o f f i c e r s  of t h e  B r i t i sh  army. n 2  
A l t h o u ~ h  l a t e r  bo th  T i t o  and D j i l a s  pe r sona l ly  apologized t o  
3 S t a l i n ,  l:oscow now considered i t  s i g n i f i c a n t  proof of Yqo- 
s l a v i a ' s  a n t i - S o v i e t  tendencies .  
The communication f u r t h e r  s t a t e d  t h a t  t h e  c i v i l i a n  
m i s s i o n  had been withdrawn because of t h e  r e f u s a l  of Yu5oslav 
covernment departments t o  ~ i v e  conomic i n f  o m a t  ion t o  Sovie t  
pe rsonne l  wi thout  t h e  approval  of the s t a t e  s e c u r i t y  organs. 
Th i s  meant t h a t  " the  Yuroslav s e c u r i t y  organs c o n t r o l l e d  and 
supe rv i sed  the  Sov ie t  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  i n  Yugoslavia. n4 1n 
I 
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a d d i t i o n ,  a n t i - S o v i e t  rumors were being c i r c u l a t e d  by t h e  
Yugoslavs : t h i s  was not  j u s t i f i a b l e  i n t e r - P a r t y  c r i t i c i s m ,  
bu t  " s l a n d e r  ."I 
The l e t t e r  continued w i t h  probably i t s  most s i g n i f i -  
can t  passage:  
Again, one might mention t h a t ,  when he decided t o  
d e c l a r e  war on t h e  CPSU.~ Trotskv a l s o  s t a r t e d  w i t h  accu- 
s a t i o n s  of t he  CPSU a s  hegenerat;, as s u f f e r i n g  from the  
l i m i t a t i o n s  i n h e r e n t  i n  t h e  narrow na t iona l i sm of p e a t  
powers. Na tu ra l ly  he camouflaged a l l  t h i s  w i t h  l e f t  
s l ogans  about  world l*evolut ion.  However, i t  i s  w e l l  h o w .  
that Trotsky himself  became degenerate,  and when he w a s  
exposed, c rossed  over i n t o  t he  camp of t h e  sworn enemies 
of t h e  CPSU and the  Sovie t  Union. We t h i n k  that  the  
p o l i t i c a l  c a r e e r  of Trotsky i s  q u i t e  i n s t r u c t i v e . 3  
This was enough t o  s t r i k e  t e r r o r  i n  t he  h e a r t s  of t h e  
mos t hardened r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s  . 
On A p r i l  13 t h e  Yugoslavs aga in  addressed themselves 
t o  l;oscow, pleading,  
Our on ly  d e s i r e  i s  t o  e l imina t e  every doubt and d i s -  
b e l i e f  i n  t h e  p u r i t y  of he camradely and b r o t h e r l y  f e e l -  
 in^ of l o y a l t y  of our  S & of t h e  C.P.Y. t o  t h e  7PS3, t o  
whom we w i l l  always remain thankfu l  f o r  t h e  i -a rx i s t -  
L e n i n i s t  d o c t r i n e  which has l e d  us u n t i l  now and w i l l  
l e a d  us i n  t h e  f u t u r e  . . . . 11 5 
Furthermore, they reques ted  that  one o r  more nenbers  
of t h e  C.C.  of t h e  5 .T .S .U.  v i s i t  Yugoslavia and see  f o r  them- 
s e l v e s  the  e x e n p l a q  conduct of t h e  c . F . Y . ~  
'communist Pa r ty  of the  Sovie t  Union. 
3 ~ h e  Soviet-Yuposlav Dispute, p. 15. The au tho r1  s i t a l i c s .  
4 ~ e n t r a l  Committee. 
5 ~ h e  Soviet-Yuyoslav Dispute,  p.  30 
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The Sov ie t  r e p l y  of !lay 4 was mconpromlsinq and c m -  
p la ined  t h a t  t h e  "Yuqoslav Cmrsdes  do no t  a c c e p t  ~ r i t i ~ l s m  
f n  a l larxist  manner, bu t  i n  a b o u ~ g e o i s  manner. . . . "I It 
a l s o  s t a t e d ,  perhaps unwisely : 
Even though t h e  French and I t a l i a n  CPs CsicT have s o  
f a r  ach ieved  l e s s  success  than  t h e  C?Y, th is  i s  not  due 
t o  any  s p e c i a l  q v a l i t i e s  of t h e  C?Y, bu t  m a b l g  because 
. . . t he  Sov ie t  army came t o  t h e  a i d  of t h e  Yugoslav 
people ,  crushed the  German invader ,  l i b e r a t e d  Belzrade 
and i n  t h i s  way c rea t ed  t h e  cond i t i ons  which were neces- 
s a q  for the CPY t o  achleue power.2 
Thus far, the c o n f l l c t  had been conf ined.  t o  the very I 
t o p  eche lons  of t h e  r e s p e c t i v e  C o ~ ~ a u n i s t  p a r t i e s ,  but  now t h e  
SovZets were say ing  t h a t  they  had l i b e r a t e d  Yugoslavia. This I 
w a s  a p e r s o n a l  a f f r o n t  t.0 t h e  thousands of Yugoslavs who had I 
t aken  p a r t  i n  t h e  r e s i s t a n c e  movement, and t h i s  clalm, un- I 
doubtedly ,  m i l i t a t e d  a p s i n s t  Russia .3 F o r  purely  psychological  
I I 
rqasons ,  i f  f o r  nothing e l s e ,  t h i s  i s  a cAharge which t h e  C.P.Y. I 
f i n d s  most u s e f u l  t o  eaphasize  and d i s c u s s  before  t he  Y u p s l a v  I 
people . 4 
The Sov ie t  l e t t e r  of ITay 4 ended wi th  a proposal  
t h a t  t h e  ' i u ~ o s l a v  ques t ion  be d i scussed  a t  the  next  meeting I 
3~.:osta Piyade cl:osa Pi jade], About t h e  Legend That t he  
o s l a v  Upris ing Owed I t s  Exis tence t o  Sovie t  Assis tance 
3assi7i C s i n ~ ;  the  records  of t h e  1-u;oslav London, 1950), , . 
People s L i b e r a t l  on Al~ny, P i  jade p re sen t s  remarkably c l e a r  
evidence t o  prove t h a t  the  Sovie t  Union did  not  provide the  
P a r t i s a n  a m p  wi th  any m a t e r l a l  o r  rn l l i t a ry  a s s i s t a n c e  u n t i l  
1944. Althouph he concedes t h a t  t h e  3ed Amy helped i n  t he  
l i b o r a t l o n  of Pe l r rade  and o t h e r  a r e a s ,  P i  jade i s  b i t t e r l y  
c r i t i c a l  about  the  l a c k  of Sovie t  h e l p  i n  1942 and 1943. 
F a c t s  such a s  these  were po ten t  psycholoqical  weapons 
i n  t he  hands of t h e  l i u ~ o s l a v  l e a d e r s .  
7' 
Ulam, op. e., p. 73. 
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1 
of t h e  Cominf o m .  T i t o ,  a p p a r e n t l y  r e a l i z i n g  the  outcome 
of such a d i s c u s s i o n ,  n o t i f i e d  i.loscow t h a t  Yugoslav r ep re -  
s e n t a t i v e s  would not  a t t e n d . 2  On lag 22 t h e  Sov ie t  Union 
n o t i f i e d  Yugoslavia that  by r eques t  of Hungary and Czecho- 
s l o v a k i a  t h e  nex t  Cominform meet ing would t a k e  p l ace  t h e  
l a t t e r  half of June.  3 
Catha r s i s  
The Cominform Conference of June 1948 w a s  not  c a l l e d  
t o  Belgrade,  t h e  s e a t  of t h e  o rgan iza t i on ,  b u t  t o  Eukharest .  
On June 28,  t h e  Corninform r e l e a s e d  t he  now famous communique 
c o n t a i n i n g  t h e  t e x t  of t h e  r e s o l u t i o n  e x p e l l i n g  t he  C.P.Y. 
from i t s  ranks .  The r e s o l u t i o n  ended ~ i t h  an  appea l  t o  t he  
r ank  and f i l e  of t h e  Yugoslav Par ty .  
The Yucoslav l e a d e r s  e v i d e n t l y  20 no t  understand,  o r ,  
probably ,  p r e t end  they do n o t  understand,  t h a t  such a 
n a t i o n a l i s t  l i n e  can o n l ~  l e a d  t o  Y ~ o s l a v i a ' s  deeener- 
a t i o n  i n t o  a n  o rd ina ry  b o u r ~ e o i s  r epub l i c ,  t o  t h e  l o s s  
of I t s  independence and t o  I t s  t r a n s f o m a t i o n  i n t o  a 
colony of t he  i x p e r i a l i s t  coun t r i e s .  
The Informat ion  Eureau does not  doubt that i n s i d e  t h e  
Communist P a r t y  of Yuf~os lav ia  t h e r e  a r e  s$ f i c i e n t  hea l -  
t h y  elements,  l o y a l  t o  :iarxisrn-Leninism, t o  t h e  i n t e r -  
n a t i o n a l  t r a d i t i o n s  of t he  Yugoslav Communist Pa r ty  and 
t o  t h e  uni ted  s o c i a l i s t  f r o n t .  
The i r  t a s k  i s  t o  c m p e l  t h e i r  p r e sen t  l e a d e r s  t o  recog- 
n i z e  t h e i r  mis takes  openly and hones t l y  and t o  r e c t i f y  
them; t o  b reak  w i t h  na t iona l i sm,  r e t u r n  t o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l -  
i s m ;  and i n  eve- way t o  conso l ida t e  t h e  un i t ed  s o c i a l i s t  
f r o n t  a ~ a i n s  t imper ia l ism.  
Should t he  p r e s e n t  l e a d e r s  of the  Tur-oslav S m u n i s t  
Pa r ty4  prove i n c a m b l e  of doing th i s ,  t h e i r  job i s  t o  re -  
l ~ h e  Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute,  p. 52. 
%bid. ,  p. 62: Four l e a d e r s  of t h e  C.P.Y. were s i n c l e d  
ou t  p e r s o n a l l y :  They were T i t o ,  D j i l a s ,  I ;ardelj ,  and i:'ankovic'. 
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p lace  them and t o  advance a new i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t  l e ade r -  
s h i p  of t he  Pa r ty .  
The Informat ion Bureau does no t  doubt t h a t  t h e  Comu- 
n i s t  Par ty  of Yu o s l a v i a  w i l l  be a b l e  t o  f u l f i l  t h i s  
honourable t a s k .  9 
Thus, t h e  Corninform dest royed the  f i c t i o n  that It 
was an  o rgan iza t ion  r e s p e c t i n g  the  sovere ign  r i g h t s  of i t s  
member s t a t e s ,  t h a t  it was no more, a s  was claimed prev ious ly ,  
than  a  c l e a r i n g  house . Perhaps even more s i g n i f i c a n t ,  some 
of the  h i p h e s t  gove rnmnta l  o f f i c i a l s  of t h e  Sovie t  Union, 
IIungary, Bulgar ia ,  Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and Poland had 
openly and p u b l i c l y  app rop r i a t ed  the  r i g h t  t o  i n t e r f e r e  i n  
the  a f f a i r s  of a s o v e r e i p  s t a t e ,  and had c a l l e d  f o r  t h e  
overthrow of i t s  e x i s t i n g  government. The k i d  gloves  were 
o f f ;  t h e  Sov ie t  Union was now openly a t tempt ing  t o  b r i n g  
Yuposlavia t o  h e r  knees. 
I n  t h e  w e l t e r  of confusion fol lowing the  Zminform 
r e s o l u t i o n  i t  was f r e q u e n t l y  overlooked-- and w i t h  t he  pas- 
s ace  of S e a r s  f r e q u e n t l y  forco t ten- -  t h a t  the  C.P.V. re fused  
t o  acce? t  t h i s  d e c i s i o n  a s  f i ~ a l ,  and s t i l l  c lung t o  t h e  r a t h e r  
absurd  hope t h a t  a  r e c o n c i l i a t i o n  was noss ib le .  It  was not  
t h a t  T i t o  and h i s  subord ina tes  were p o l i t i c a l l y  naive, but 
t h e y  must have been somewhat bewildered. Eere was a  group 
of men, f a n a t i c s  who had spent  n o s t  of t h e i r  a d u l t  l i v e s  
f i c h t i n q  f o r  Communism, suddenly f i n d i n g  themselves a t  odds 
wi th  a l l  o t h e r  Communists and completely b e r e f t  of f r i e n d s .  
They could no t  t u rn  t o  t he  Il'est f o r ,  a f t e r  a l l ,  t \ep  were 
'1bid * 9 pp. 69-70. 
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t h e  sworn enemies of cap i t a l i sm.  Vlhatever strugp>e l a y  ahead, 
t he  Yugoslavs would have t o  f a c e  i t  a s  Communists. The i r  on ly  
hope, as t h e y  saw i t ,  was r e c o n c i l i a t i o n !  
I n  Ju ly ,  a month a f t e r  t h e  break,  t he  Yugoslavs h e l d  
t h e i r  F i f t h  P a r t y  Congress. A l t h o u ~ h  a t t a c k i n g  the  Cominf o m  
r e s o l u t i o n ,  they c a r e f u l l y  avoided any d i r e c t  c r i t i c i s m  of 
S o v i e t  l e a d e r s .  They vigorously  defended t h e i r  own p o l i c i e s  
and a t tempted  t o  prove t h a t  they  deserved Sov ie t  "commendation 
1 
r a t h e r  t han  condemnation." The same month, t h e  Yugoslav de le -  
g a t i o n  t o  t h e  Conference of Danubian S t a t e s  made a s i n g u l a r l y  
i n g r a t i a  t i n e  g e s t u r e  . The Yugoslavs supported Sov ie t  Foreign 
b l i n i s t e r  Andrei Vishinsky and a s s i s t e d  h i m  i n  f o r c i n g  two* 
t h e  S o v i e t  D r a f t  Convention. This convention placed long 
s e c t i o n s  of t h e  Danube under t he  c o n t r o l  of the  Sov ie t  Union, 
much t o  t h e  de t r iment  of Yuroslsvia  and. o t h e r  Suropean coun- 
t r i e s .  2 
A s  l a t e  a s  February 1949, t he  Yueoslsv governqent 
a n p l i e d  f o r  membership i n  t he  Council f o r  Kutual  Economic 
Ass i s tance ,  an o rpan iza t ion  s e t  up by t h e  U.S.S.3. and t h e  
s a t e l l i t e s ,  bu t  the  a p ~ l i c a t i o n  was unceremoniously r e j e c t e d m 3  
Gradual ly ,  t h e  Yuvoalav l e a d e r s  r e a l i z e d  t h a t  r e c o n c i l i a t i o n  
I?.:. S. Handler, It Zomuni s t  Dopa  and J u ~ o s l a v  P rac t i ce ,  " 
Fore ipn  A f f a i r s ,  XXX ( ~ p r i l ,  1952) ,  427-428. 
3 ~ e e  m i t e  Book On A ~ ~ ; r e s s i v e  A c t i v i t i e s  by the  Govern- 
ments of t h e  I .S .S .i\. , Polanc,, ~ z e c h o s l o v s k i a  , Suqyary, h'ursnia, 
I u l ~ ~ r l a  and Albanin ':on~rc.s Y u ~ y o s l ~ v i ~  ( :.:eopac: ::inlstrp 
o?' orto l,mn Af 1 ' F l . i ~ ~  of t i lo  T'ederal I+ ople  s Zepublic of kluco- 
s l ~ v i a ,  1951 ) , pp. 233-255. 
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was impossible .  The economic blockade imposed by t h e  Sov ie t  
union,' t h e  t rea tment  of  Yugoslav diplomat ic  o f f i c i a l s  i n  
Cminform coun t r i e s  ,2 t he  ab roca t ion  of t r e a t i e s  and agree-  
m e n t ~ , ~  and o t h e r  h o s t i l e  a c t s  fo rced  Yuposlavia t o  t u r n ,  
s t e p  by s t e p ,  toward the West. Given time, t h e  s t a t e  propa- 
ganda organs could make it seem not too  unna tu ra l  t h a t  a 
lr Communist democracy1' should a s s o c i a t e  i t s e l f  w i th  t h e  
I1cap i t a l i s  ts"  and " i m p e r i a l i s t s  .I1 
Action and Reaction: A Summary 
I n  t h e  summer of 1947 t h e  U.S.S.R. embarked on a  
d r ive  t o  consol ida te  i t s  p o s i t i o n  i n  Eas te rn  Europe. American 
f o r e i g n  po l i cy  had taken a  sudden aggress ive tu rn :  f i r s t ,  t he  
Truman Coct r ine ,  designed t o  conta in  Cornrunism; and then  the 
F'larshall Plan,  compleaentin,.r t h e  containment po l i cy  and 
c a u s i n ~  d i s t u r b i n g  r e a c t i o n s  i n  the  Sovie t  s a t e l l i t e s .  The 
next  American move could conceivably be aimed d i r e c t l y  a t  
wooing e a s t e r n  Europe away from the  Sovie t  Union. !.:oscow had  
t o  c l e a r l y  and i r revocably  de l imi t  he r  sphere of in f luence .  
I n  tighten in^ h i s  trip on e a s t e r n  Surope, S t a l i n  made 
a s e r i o u s  blunder .  He a l i e n a t e d  Yuyoslavia, t h e  e f f e c t s  of 
'See i b i d  ., p p .  283-348. 
2 ~ e e  i b i d . ,  pp. 457-471. 
3 ~ e e  i b id . ,  pp. 447-456. 
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which were t o  d e a l  S o v i e t  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  a s e v e r e  setback. '  
The o r i g i n a l  p o i n t  of  c o n f l % = t  i n  t h e  Soviet-Yuposlav d i s -  
pu t e  was n o t  i d e o l o g i c a l ,  b u t  a p r a c t i c a l ,  p o l i t i c a l  i s s u e ;  
i .e. ,  who would wie ld  p o l i t i c a l  power i n  Yugoslavia?  The 
v a r i  o w  cha ree s  of "devia t ionismt1 were s o  much window d r e s s i n g .  
The S o v i e t  Union was simply opposed t o  a Communist government 
and Communist P a r t y  c o n t r o l l e d  by a group of non-Russian 
Communists, i n  which t h e  Russians were on t h e  o u t s i d e ,  s o  t o  
speak,  no m a t t e r  how c l o s e l y  t h e i r  d i r e c t i v e s  were fo l lowed.  
The S o v i e t  Union was n o t  p r i m a r i l y  concerned w i t h  what T i t o  
and h i s  f o l l o w e r s  were do ing  w l th  t h e i r  a b s o l u t e  power, it 
was on ly  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  r e p l a c i n g  them w i t h  somebody complete ly  
s u b s e r v i e n t  t o  Koscow. 
Fetween 1944 and 1948 t h e r e  w a s  i n  T i t o 1  s p o s i t i o n  a 
l a r p e  amount o f  dual ism.  He was a  poplllar r e s i s t a n c e  he ro  
and n a t i o n a l  l e a d e r  and,  a t  t h e  same t ime,  was, i n  e f f e c t ,  
a n  B r e n t  of a  f o r e i ~ n  c o u r l t ~ .  T i t o  w s s  obvZously d i s t u r b e d  
abou t  t h i s  l a t t e r  p o s i t i o n ;  he had expected  t o  be t r e a t e d  as  
an  e q u a l .  A f t e r  it had become a p ~ a r e n t  t h a t  S t a l i n  had no 
i n t e n t i o n  of p a n t i n g  him e q u a l i t y ,  t h e  Y u ~ o s l a v  l e a d e r ,  
somewhat d i s c r u n t l e d ,  s e t t l e d  down t o  his  double r o l e .  Th i s  
r o l e  could be f u l f i l l e d ,  however, on ly  a s  l ong  a s  t h e r e  was 
a s u f f i c i e n t  community, o r  coincidence ,  of i n t e r e s t  between 
l ~ h i s  was on ly  one of h i s  b lunders .  Another was t h e  
e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of t he  P e r l i n  Blockade i n  June 1948, w3en the 
S o v i e t s  a t t emp ted  t o  i n c o r p o r a t e  F e r l i n ,  t he  l o c i c a l  c e n t e r  
of Z ~ s t e r n  German, i n t o  t h e  Sov ie t  Zone. See Lukacs, 9. 
e., pp. 695 ff. 
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Yugoslavia and t h e  Sovie t  Union. l!,%en t h e s e  i n t e r e s t s  came 
i n t o  c o n f l i c t ,  one o f  T i t o f s  twin r o l e s  would have t o  be 
d i s  carded.  
Even a f t e r  t h e  summer of 1947, when t h e  Sov ie t  Union 
decided t o  b r i n g  t he  s a t e l l i t e  c o u n t r i e s  i r r e v o c a b l y  under 
t h e  S t a l i n i s t  h e e l ,  T i t o  a t tempted t o  continue i n  h i s  dua l  
r o l e .  It was t o o  l a t e ;  t h e  Kremlin considered t h i s  heresy.  
T i t o f s  p o s i t i o n  i n  the  d i s p u t e  i s  ea sy  t o  perce ive .  
When t h e  d i s p u t e  broke out  e a r l y  i n  1948, t h e  s m a l l e s t  p r i c e  
t he  S o v i e t  Union would have exacted would have been a change 
i n  t h e  t o p  l e a d e r s h i p  of t h e  C.P.Y. This change might have 
been gradua l ,  s h i f t i n g  the  former l e a d e r s  t o  g o v e r n ~ e n t a l  and 
P a r t y  p o s i t i o n s  of decreas ing  importance, o r  a complete and 
immediate purqe m i @ t  have taken p lace .  I n  e i t h e r  even t ,  T i t o  
and h i s  l i e u t e n a n t s  would have been depr ived of both  P a r t y  
and ~ o v e r n m e n t a l  c o n t r o l .  Thus, t he  choices  before  t h e  
Yuroslavs  were only  two: abd ica t e ,  and perhaps ~ i s k  p h y s i c a l  
e x t i n c t i o n ,  or f i p h t .  The choice was obvious-- f i g h t !  
I n  making t h i s  dec i s ion  t he  l e a d e r s  of t h e  C.P.Y. 
were on f a i r l y  s a f e  ground. T i t o ' s  entourage was young, 
t hey  were f i p h t e r s ,  and they  had r i s e n  t o  p o s i t i o n  under his 
l e a d e r s h i p .  They were l o y a l  t o  the  resime and t o  t h e i r  
l e a d e r .  Even a p a i n s t  t h e  tremendous power of the  Sovie t  
Union, t hey  would s tand wi th  T i t o  and f i g h t .  Xoreover, i t  
was extremely u n l i k e l y  t h a t  the Sovie t  Union would e m ~ l o p  
armed f o r c e ,  and perhaps p r e c i p i t a t e  !:'orld Y'ar 111. I f  they 
d id  n o t ,  Yi~pos lav ia  could probably ho ld  out .  
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The Sov ie t  p o s i t i o n  i s  more d i f f i c u l t  t o  unders tand.  
C e r t a i n l y ,  when the  d i spu t e  b r o k e . o u t ,  no s i n g l e  t e n e t  of 
i n f a l l i b i l i t y  of t h e  Sov ie t  Union. S t a l i n  probably  d id  n o t  
b e l i e v e  t h a t  T i t o  could,  o r  would, ho ld  ou t  a g a i n s t  the  com- 
b ined  f o r c e s  of t h e  Corninform c o u n t r i e s  under Sovie t  l e ade r -  
s h i p .  But by May 1948, i t  had become obvious that T i t o  i n t e n -  
ded t o  try. 
Why t h e n  d id  S t a l i n  pursue h i s  p o l i c y  toward Yugo- 
s l a v i a ?  Here t h e r e  i s  perhaps d i s c e r n i b l e  a n  elernent o f  
w i s h f u l  t h i n k i n g .  I f  T i t o  and h i s  l i e u t e n a n t s  d i d  not  capi-  
t u l a t e ,  p o s s i b l y  t h e  Yugoslav rank and f i l e  would e l imina t e  
them 'when the  Sovie t  Union's d i sp l ea su re  became known. T h i s  
was h i ~ h l y  u n l i k e l y ,  an2 S t a l i n  must have known it .  In  the 
f i r  s t  p l ace ,  ?ornunism i n  Y u ~ o s l a v i a  was t h e  home-grown v a r i e t y ,  
n o t  imported f r o m  I.'oscow. Secondly, a n  i n t e r n a l  r evo lu t ion  
by I' Tominf o m i s  tsn would need s t r o n g  l eade r sh ip ,  which was 
1 
s a d l y  l a c k i n g .  And l a s t l y ,  t h e  Sovie t  b e l i t t l i n g  of t h e  
Y u ~ o s l a v  r e s i s t a n c e  movement, made the  s t r u g ~ l e  one not  of 
i d e o l o m  b u t  of n a t i o n a l  honor. 
l ~ l a r n ,  9. c i t . ,  pp. 109-116 and p. 125: Althourh a  
few minor  ~ o v e r n m e n m  f i ~ u r e s  s ided  wi th  the  Sovie t  Union 
i n  t h e  d i spu t e ,  only  two key Pa r ty  o f f i c i a l s  were p u r ~ e d .  
I n  t h e  s p r i n ~  of 1948 S r e t e n  ~ h u j o v i g  and Andri ja  FIebrang, 
bo th  members of the  Zen t r a l  Committee, were convicted of 
t r e a s o n  and sentenced t o  pr ison.  Hebranr was probably 
p l o t t i n c  wi th  t h e  1T.S.S.R. a ~ a i n s t  Yusoslavia,  bu t  t h e r e  i s  
evidenco t h a t  ~ h ~ l j o v i c '  was more of a  Sovie t  dupe than a f u l l  
p a r t n e r  i n  t h e  a t t empt  t o  d i s p l a c e  T i t o .  
A s  T i t o  and Karde l j  had w r i t t e n  t o  Koscow on A p r i l  13, 
1948 : "go m a t t e r  how much each of us l oves  t h e  l a n d  of 
s o c i a l i s m ,  t h e  U.S.S.R., he. can, i n  no case  love h i s  country  
l e s s ,  which i s  a l s o  developing socia l ism--  i n  t h i s  concre te  
case  t h e  FPRY, f o r  which so  many thousands of i t s  most pro- 
g r e s s i v e  people f e l l  ."I 
Thus, i t  must have been obvious t o  S t a l i n  t h a t  t he  
chances of f a i l u r e  were h igh .  \Yould i t  not  have been b e t t e r  
t o  have r e t a i n e d  an "independent" Yugoslavia t han  t o  s h a t t e r  
t h e  i l l u s i o n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  Comunismf s s o l i d a r i t y ?  The 
ICrernlinls l i g h t s  must have burned l a t e  while t h i s  ques t i on  
was be ing  dec ided .  The answer was-- No! 
B e t t e r  t o  l o s e  Y u ~ o s l a v i a ,  f o r  a time a t  l e a s t ,  
t han  c r e a t e  t he  impression t h a t  the  Sovie t  Union was 
l o s i n e  i t s  uncompromisinr v i ~ o r  and i t s  pass ion  f o r  
i n f a l l i b i l i t y .  Concede, on the  o t h e r  hand, and the 
charm was broken .2 

A t  t h i s  w r i t i n g ,  some s i x  y e a r s  a f t e r  t h e  monunental 
Cominform schism, Yueoslavia has  long s ince  ceased t o  be a 
p o l i t i c a l  nove l ty  and has becorns a n  i n t e g r a l ,  though same- 
what unique,  p a r t  of t h e  European p o l i t i c a l  scene.  I n  t h e  
g r e a t e s t  i d e o l o g i c a l  b a t t l e  of modern t imes,  i f  no t  of a l l  
h i s t o r y ,  Yuqoslavia s t ands  a lone ,  h a l f  way between Eas t  and 
West . Two impor tan t  ques t ions ,  however, remain unanswered. 
F i r s t ,  i s  t h e r e  some i n n a t e  element i n  modern Communism t h a t  
made such a s p l i t  i n e v i t a b l e ?  And second, what lessons  and 
what conc lus ions  can t h e  West draw from t h e  even t?  
IAodern Communism, o r  S ta l in i sm,  i s  no longer  the 
f e r v e n t ,  v iqorous  politico-economic i d e o l o m  of t h i r t y - f i v e  
y e a r s  aFo. That cont inues  only a s  an i l l u s i o n  u s e f u l  f o r  
mass p r o n a ~ a n d a .  Comunism i n  ,Russia has become a system 
and a n  i d e o l o m  of power. Thus, by i t s  v i c t o r i e s ,  S t a l i n i sm 
endanrers  t h e  very system t k t  i t  propa,%tes. A s  i n  t he  
ca se  of Yuposlavia, t h e  d e s i r e  f o r  power and c o n t r o l  i n  Pa r ty  
and rovernment won over  fomnunist fana t ic i sm.  ?tloreover, a s  
w i th  any system of irn?erialisrn, S t a l i n i sm i s  bolmd t o  corne 
i n t o  c o n f l i c t  w i th  s a t e l l i t e  na t iona l i sm.  
C e r t a i n l y  Russia i s  aware of t h i s  i n t e r n a l  danger. 
The " T i t o i s t "  purpes which swept t h e  s a t e l l i t e  coun t r i e s  
fo l lowing  the  Yucoslav a f f a i r  bea r  t h i s  out .  Few of T i t o ' s  
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o l d  Corninform comrades were t o  remain. A l i s t  of t h e  m- 
f o r t u n a t e  purcees  r e a d s l i k e  a paEe f r o n  R h r s  n o  i n  Sat-  
-
e l l i t e  Communism : Gomulka, Klizko, and Bienkowski i n  Poland; 
Rajk, Szonyi,  and Pa l f fy  in Bungary; Kostov, Pavlov, S t e f -  
anov, and PTechev i n  Bulgar ia ;  Xoxe, Kerentyl ,  and S h r i s t o  i n  
Albania;  Klernentis and Wovy in Czechoslovakia; Patrascanu i n  
Hungary. Even Zhdanov and 3 h i t r o v  were soon t o  d i e ,  though 
a p p a r e n t l y  f rox n a t u r a l  causes.  
The p r i c e  pa id  i n  t hese  pe r iod ic  purges, which a r e  
s t i l l  cont inu ing ,  has been considerable .  I'ihile making cer -  
t a i n  t h a t  no new "Titot '  r i s e s  up wi th in  s a t e l l i t e  Pa r ty  
ranks ,  t h e  S o v i e t s  have destroyed some of t h e i r  most capable 
and i d e a l i s t i c  l e a d e r s .  I n  t h e  o v e r a l l  view, w i l l  i t  have 
been worth i t ?  I 
I 
Y;hile t he  '.Yest was c e l e b m t i n g  i t s  Colt! '.'!ar "v ic toryw 
of t h e  E e r l i n  A i r - l i f t  and while i t  was s t i l l  r e j o i c i n p  over 
the  r i f t  i n  the  Corninform, China f e l l  t o  Tarnnunism. It i s  
i n t e r e s t i n p  t o  specu la t e  on S t a l i n l s  r eac t ion .  D i 6  s i x t e e n  
m i l l i o n  Y u ~ o s l a v s  mean a s  auch as f o u r  hundred m i l l i o n  Chinese? 
Did the  p s y c h o l o ~ i c a l  de fea t  i n  %many o f f s e t  t he  t e r r l t o r i a l  I 
v i c t o r y  i n  China? The answers a r e  obvious. 
The ques t ion  has  been r a i s e d ,  "Was a l l  t h i s  p a r t  of 
Q complex p lan  o r i f l n a t i n g  i n  i.loscow?" Did S t s l i n  s a c r i f i c e ,  
s o  t o  speak, Yuroslavia ,  an6 d i d  he d i v e r t  a t t e n t i o n  t o  Be r l i n  
s imply t o  ~ a i n  an even more p r e t e n t i o u s  v i c t o q  i n  Asia? 
Probably n o t .  A t  l e a s t  t he re  i s  no concrete  evidence t o  ~ i v e  
I 
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credence t o  s u c h  a t h e s i s .  But t h i s  even t  c l e a r l y  p o i n t s  up I 
t h e  danger  of momentam r e l a x a t i o n  a g a i n s t  Communism. The I f 
West should  be c o n t i n u a l l y  on p a r d  a g a i n s t  purposefu l  o r  
a c c i d e n t a l  d i v e r s i o n s .  It  can prove very c o s t l y .  
Today Yugoslavia i s  s t i l l  Communist. Af t e r  t h e  r i f t  
w i t h  Moscow, T i t o  found t h a t  t h e r e  was no kindred i d e o l o g i c a l  
concep t  t o  which he could t u r n .  Consequently, a new i n t e r -  
p r e t a t i o n  had t o  evolve  i n  o rde r  t o  r a t i o n a l i z e  Yugos lav la fs  
p o s i t i o n .  It  suddenly became apparen t ,  t o  t h e  Yugoslavs a t  
l e a s t ,  t h a t  i t  was S t a l i n  who was p r o s t i t u t i n g  t he  t each ings  
of t h e  m a s t e r s .  I n  r e t r o s p e c t ,  they saw t h a t  t h i s  w a s  no 
sudden change, b u t  t h a t  the Sovie t  Union had been pursuing 
a n  "an t i - ;h la rx i s t "  l i n e  f o r  yea r s .  Thus, t h e  i d e o l o g i c a l  
I 
break ,  w3ich was more apparen t  than  r e a l ,  fol lowed t h e  I 
~ o l i t i c a l  break.  I n  Y u ~ o s l a v i a  i t  w a s  no longer  i-'arxism- 
Leninism-Stal inism ; i t  was trarxism-Leninism-Titoism. I 
:?/hat t hen  i s  Titoism? It i s  a  grave and r ecu r r en t ,  ! 
b u t  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  f a t a l ,  d i s ea se  of S t a l i n i s t  Communism. 
Russia does recopnize  i t ;  t h e  J e s t  a u s t  recognize it. To be 
su re ,  t he  cond i t i ons  f o r  the development of T i t o i m  cannot 
be a u t o n a t i c a l l y  reproduced i n  any and every Zomunis t  couqtry.  
However, t h e  United S t a t e s  must watch f o r  the  s p p t o m s  and 
e x p l o i t  the  s i t u a t i o n  whenever i t  may occur.  There a r e  only  
two a l t e r n a t i v e s :  one, a wi l l -o f - the-wisp  f o r e i c n  po l i cy  
b ~ s e d  on wi sh fu l  t h i n k i n ~  and free6om ba l loons ,  would be 
dangerous;  t h e  o t h e r ,  o u t r i p h t  w a r ,  would be disastrous-. 
P A \ 
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What should  t he  American a t t i t u d e  be toward T i t o ?  
I 
Fundamental ly,  Yugoslavia i s  no b e t t e r  o r  no worse t han  
Russia,  though Yugoslavia t emporar i ly  l a c k s  any expans ion i s t  
t endenc i e s .  S t i l l ,  Yueoslavia l  s holdout  a g a i n s t  t h e  Sovie t  
Union i s  of paramount importance t o  t he  Yest .  Yugoslavia i s  
n o t  democrat ic ,  y e t  i t  i s  on t h e  s i d e  of t h e  n f r e e  world." 
This p roves  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  room i n  t h e  western  camp f o r  de- 
termined o p p o s i t i o n  t o  the  so -ca l l ed  " r i ~ h t e s t  p o l i t i c s n  and 
" c a p i t a l i s t  economicsn a s  t y p i f i e d  by the  United S t a t e s .  
P a r a d o x i c a l l y  enough, t h i s  i s  i n p o r t a n t  t o  t h e  'l/est. For as 
l o n g  as Ti to i sm cont inues ,  i t  w i l l  provide a  r e a l  and a 
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